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Executive summary
Introduction
• Tools for automated quantitative analysis of information are more and
more required in the framework of early warning systems, to support
political decision makers in making timely evaluations of the risk of
severe crises.
• This report describes a scientifically sound approach to build a statisti-
cal model to assess quantitatively the risk of intra-state armed conflict
in any country in the world.
• Attention is paid to operationalise this approach in early situation as-
sessment.
• Conflict risk assessment studies investigate the causal link between the
risk of an armed conflict and a given set of socio-economic indicators
such as, among others GDP, GDP growth, exports and imports .
• Some variables may not be causes but simply associated factors (e.g.
infant mortality, life expectancy).
• For decision makers the output of a conflict prediction model should
be the location, time frame, impacts of conflict and conflict response
feedback effects.
• Models using structural data make a static assessment of country level
performance, which can then be ranked for conflict risk. The temporal
trend provide additional information on the evolution of the situation.
Method
• The study models the incidence of armed conflict; the dependent vari-
able is coded 1 for all periods of ongoing war.
i
ii
• Twenty structural indicators were selected on the basis of data avail-
ability and relevance.
• The indicators have been extensively used in other studies and have
been shown to be related more or less to the risk of armed conflict.
• We checked the distribution of all the variables, transformed the data
for normalisation and variance stabilization and standardized the data.
• A Markov Chain Monte Carlo or MCMC method was used to impute
missing values.
• The regression model estimates the probability that an armed conflict
occurs in a specific country in a specific year.
• A variable selection method was applied to reduce the number of vari-
ables in the final model and improve its consistency.
• Countries that experience an armed conflict are more prone to another
conflict in the future. For each country and for each year, we estimated
the probability of conflict due to the conflict history.
• We finally took the average value between the probability estimated
with structural factor regression model and that related to the history
of conflicts. This can be regarded as the overall risk of armed conflict
given the socio-economic situation of the country in the recent past.
Outcome
• We considered several specifications of the model and data processing
in order to select the method that offers the best trade-off between
quality of fit and completeness in the possibility of prediction.
• The results of the first analysis show that the likelihood of armed
conflict is significantly associated with the GDP per capita, the GDP
growth rate, the ODA per capita, the ODA per unit of GDP, the ex-
ports par unit of GDP, the exports of merchandise, the size of the
population, the level of democracy and with the different indices of
social fractionalisation/ polarization.
• Time series of estimated risk provide useful information to assess if the
situation is improving or worsening for each country.
iii
Conclusion
• The regression model may be used to predict the probability of conflict
outbreak and used operationally for warning about the risk of war in
any country.
• However, while certain structural conditions may exacerbate already
existing political tensions in a country, the mechanisms which then
lead to conflict are not well understood and can be highly specific.
• The estimates for some countries must be interpreted with caution as
their socioeconomic data were actually sparse. This is especially the
case for Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the model can be updated
easily as new data become available.
• The method outlined is operational; it can be used for estimation of
conflict probability and for prediction of conflict for countries for which
structural data exists; results are as good as any currently in use. Es-
timated probability time series show that our model is consistent over
time. Appendix 1 provides an example for the Kenyan case.
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Chapter 1
Bibliographical review
This chapter summarizes previous works on conflict risk assessment. This
selective review concentrates on tools and methodologies that could be used
to set up an early warning system. After a general introduction on current
early warning and risk assessment issues, we review the main approaches to
quantitatively assess the risk of an armed conflict.
1.1 Introduction
Communication facilities and broad use of digital documents provide the
potential for automated quantitative information analysis to support political
decision making. In the field of conflict studies, automated data processing
for relevant information extraction becomes critical as a huge amounts of
data are being collected on countries, political and lobbying organizations.
Quantitative analysis should therefore help decision makers in evaluating the
risk of severe crises early enough before their outbreak.
This paper focuses on conflict early warning, including risk assessment.
While Yiu and Mabey (2005) suggested to make a distinction between the
two topics, we consider that the risk assessment is a part of early warning in
the sense it assesses the probability that a stable situation turns into conflict
of a certain magnitude (considered as critical by the decision makers). The
situation will be classified as of high concern once the probability of outbreak
of a conflict reaches a given threshold. An ideal tool should be capable of
gradual change in the estimation of the probability that an armed conflict
occurs, from low (stability) to high values (imminent war).
Jenkins and Bond (2001), citing Davies and Gurr (1998), make a dis-
tinction between early warning and risk assessment as the latter focuses on
the structural conditions leading to political tensions while early warning
1
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identifies the dynamic factors leading to political crises. This distinction is
in some ways equivalent to the one proposed by Schrodt and Gerner (1997)
based on the type of the source data variables. Yiu and Mabey (2005) cate-
gorize the two concepts as one being knowable process (risk assessment) and
the other, complex process (early warning). Risk assessment seeks to assess
the probability of future instability on the basis of estimable relationships
between structural risk factors, while early warning seeks to flag emerging
crises as early as possible on the basis of monitoring recognisable patterns.
The overall objective is however to know if a crisis is likely to occur, and to
assign a probability to this event.
Quantitative methods applied to conflict risk assessment can be classified
into two categories according to the type of independent variables used to
predict or estimate the risk: (i) methods that use structural indicators as
independent variables to explain/predict the conflict events; (ii) methods that
use past conflict events to estimate the current risk. The last category try to
detect changes in the trends of a given measure of (in)stability. The overall
objective of these studies is to provide means of estimating the probability
that a latent conflict deteriorates into an armed conflict or a major crisis.
This definition does not however correspond exactly to the concept of risk.
The risk assessment should include also estimation of the conflict impact
which is not taken into account in this study.
1.2 Classification of quantitative methods
The following sections will provide the reader with a summary of studies on
inter-state and intra-state conflict. Researchers often separate both types
of conflict because it is assumed that the mechanisms behind their develop-
ment are quite different. This separation is not always obvious as inter-state
conflict may be the source of intra-state instability and war or the reverse.
We focus on studies that involve quantitative analysis. They can be grouped
into three categories according the method used to estimate the risk of armed
conflict or to understand the effect of the factors or causes of conflicts. We
should also classify in the later category studies aiming to understand the
correlation between the conflict prevalence and measurable structural or dy-
namic indicators.
1.2.1 Conflict risk-measuring index
Conflict risk-measuring indicators have been often used since they are readily
interpreted. The method consists in aggregating several basic indicators.
1.2. CLASSIFICATION OF QUANTITATIVE METHODS 3
The indices differ according the basic indicators used and the aggregation
method. We will examine two indices already used or applied to conflict
studies – the Conflict-Carrying Capacity (CCC) proposed by Jenkins and
Bond (2001) and the CIFP1 risk index (Ampleford et al., 2001)– and one
applied to environmental studies but which can be easily adapted to conflict
studies, the Environmental Sustainability Index (Esty et al., 2005).
The Conflict-Carrying Capacity index
The CCC index (Jenkins and Bond, 2001) is defined as a measure of the
ability of the state to regulate intense internal conflict without loss of system
integrity. In practice, it is based on the frequency of civil contentious actions,
state contentious actions and violent contentious actions. If Cc is the number
of civil contentious actions during a given time interval, e.g. one month, Sc is
the number of state contentious actions, Cv is the number of civil contentious
violent actions, Sv is the number of state contentious violent actions, and C
and S are the total civil and state actions, then,
CCC = 1− Cc
C
.
Sc
S
.
Cv + Sv
Cc + Sc
. (1.1)
According to the authors of this index, CCC scores above 90% represent rela-
tively stable situations. They provide a range of realistic combinations of the
three components of CCC and a description of the situation. The basic data
used to construct the CCC index are extracted from press reports. The index
was applied to the KEDS/PANDA data set2 obtained by automated coding
and classification of global news reports on social, political and economic ac-
tions. The success of such an index is highly dependent on the quality of the
data, mainly on effective classification of the events. Furthermore, the event
count measures are vulnerable to media coverage bias in which critical events
go unreported due to issue attention cycles–the media fatigue phenomenon–
and the withdrawal of reporters.
The CIFP risk index
The CIFP risk index is an aggregation of a number of socio-economic struc-
tural indicators. The aggregation function is the weighted mean of 9 com-
posite indicators built from 47 basic indicators. Each basic indicator is an
average of the rank scores achieved by the country during the last five years
on a 9-point scale. The basic indicator is corrected to take into account the
1Country Indicators for Foreign Policy
2http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/ponsacs/research/PANDA IDEA.htm
4 CHAPTER 1. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW
trend over the last five years (+1 if the indicator is worsening and -1 if it
is improving) and the variability also over the last five years (+2 for high
variability and +1 for low variability). The basic indicators are grouped into
9 composite indicators and averaged. Finally, the overall index is calculated
as a weighted mean of the 9 composite indicators. The weights are assigned
on the basis of the postulated magnitude of its impact upon overall risk.
Since this index is based on ranking countries and dividing the sample
into 9 equal categories, it must be applied on the same countries each year.
Otherwise the index value for a country could change because it is compared
to a different country dataset. It is designed to monitor the stability perfor-
mance of a country among a group of at-risk countries. In fact, the CIFP
project monitors 130 developing countries. The most recent data covers the
period 1985-2004. The dataset is normally up-dated each year.
The CIFP database contains a number of structural indicators broadly
used in studies aiming to model quantitatively the risk of a conflict. While
being relatively simple in its definition, the CIFP index produces results
almost similar to those of more sophisticated statistical models. Its main
limitation is that it requires expert judgment for the ranking of some basic
indicators and for the trend and variability scores.
As a quantitative tool to estimate the risk of conflict, the CIFP index
must be carefully interpreted. The analysis of the CIFP country ranking
of 2002 showed that the overall index values varied between 3.60 (Antigua
and Barbuda) and 7.80 (Democratic Republic of the Congo) on a 0-12 scale.
All the 106 monitored countries are therefore classified in medium and high
risk categories. Furthermore, all countries (17 countries) with a score greater
than 6.90 (high risk category) in 2002, were indeed at war in 2002, excepted
for Iran. But countries that experienced civil war after 2002 like Haiti, Ivory
Coast, Yemen, are in the medium risk category together with all the 86
remaining countries.
Environmental sustainability index
Although the topic of this paper is conflict risk assessment, we may gain
insights in exploring other fields using multiple variable composite indicators
like environment studies. The Environmental Sustainability Index–ESI (Esty
et al., 2005) is one of such composite indicators combining a large number of
variables. It is intended to benchmark the ability of countries to protect the
environment over the next several decades. In this sense, its concept may
be transposed to conflict studies because we are interested in the evaluation
or benchmarking of the conflict risk in a given country relative to others.
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Details on building this index and its sensitivity analysis are given in Esty
et al. (2005). We focus in the next section on its computation.
The ESI score represents an equally weighted average of 21 indicator
scores. Each indicator is also an equally weighted average of between 2 and
12 underlying variables, for a total of 76 variables. The variables are firstly
standardized by subtracting the mean from the observation (if the variable
contributes positively to the overall score) or by doing the opposite subtrac-
tion (if the variable contributes negatively to the overall score), and dividing
the result by the standard deviation. The authors decided to settle uni-
form weighting because a such simple aggregation is transparent and easy to
understand. Moreover, there was no supporting theory or objective mecha-
nism to determine the weight allocation among the basic variables. But this
two-level aggregation gives actually greater weight to variables included in
composite indicators made up with few variables than ones with more vari-
ables. The impact on the overall score is however low as a large number of
indicators is retained.
The main discussion is finally about relative performance of the different
countries according to their ESI score rather than the absolute value of the
score. Thinking in terms of conflict risk assessment, a similar index would be
based on the assumption that peaceful countries will always be the majority
so that the ranking allows to identify countries at risk, i.e. those on the
top or on the bottom of the ranking. However, a benchmarking indicator
can be misleading in risk assessment as it will suggest that there are always
”good” and ”bad” performances even if the overall situation has noticeably
improved.
1.2.2 Regression approach
Conflict studies aiming to find a causal relation between structural indica-
tors (independent variables or factors) and the risk of conflict (dependent
variable or response) rely basically on regression analysis. The dependent
variable is generally coded in a binary way: war (1) and peace (0). The
logistic regression approach has been widely used in conflict risk studies (see
e.g. Beck et al., 2000; Bennett and Stam, 2000; Goldstone et al., 2000; El-
badawi and Sambanis, 2002). These studies aim usually to find the relation
between the risk of conflict and a given set of indicators related to one or a
few topics. The most studied explanatory variables are economic indicators
(GDP, GDP growth, exports and imports), demographic and societal indica-
tors (total population, population density, life expectancy, infant mortality,
school enrollment, social fractionalization, etc.), political indicators (regime
type and duration, involvement in international organizations, peace dura-
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tion, political rights, neighboring countries in war, etc.) and environmental
variables (spatial dispersion of the population, mountainous terrain, forest
cover, cropland area, irrigated land, etc.).
From this list, which is not exhaustive, we can already see that some
variables are not actually explanatory variables, but just correlates of risk of
war (e.g. infant mortality, life expectancy). We must, therefore, be careful in
interpreting the regression results. For instance, in the State Failure study
(Goldstone et al., 2000), it has been shown that the following variables were
significantly associated with the risk of state failure: infant mortality, regime
type, total population, population density, bordering countries with major
conflict and trade openness (sum of imports and exports divided by the
GDP). The authors propose logically to interpret the infant mortality variable
as a measure of economic development and well-being. As the State Failure
Task Force proposed a model to forecast the risk state failure, we can use
their results to evaluate its performance, five years later.
Once the regression model is estimated, it might be used to predict the
probability of conflict outbreak and used operationally for warning about
the risk of war in any country. However, most of these studies limit their
investigations on the effect of the independent variables in the model (causal
explanation), and they don’t discuss the prediction, or forecast, issue. This
shortcoming was already pointed out by Beck et al. (2000) but most of later
studies did not consider the issue (see e.g. Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, 2002b;
Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002; Fearon, 2005). Regression models are evalu-
ated solely on the basis of their quality of fit. Beck et al. (2000) evaluated
accuracy in predicting the risk of conflict on the basis of a complex neural
network model. They showed that they were able to forecast 17% of the
international conflicts, that it is in 17% of the cases, the predicted proba-
bility was greater than 0.50 and the conflict did occurr as well. However,
they didn’t show the proportion of false alerts. We will discuss the model
assessment issue in more detail later.
In order to have insights on what could yield a model like one proposed
by Collier and Hoeffler (2004), I computed the predicted probability of civil
war using the same model and data as in the cited paper. A map of such
probabilities by country for the period 1995-1999 is shown in figure 1.1. This
map shows that there are 10 countries for which the predicted probability is
greater than 0.20 (this threshold corresponds to a sensitivity of the model of
about 50% whereas its specificity remains sufficiently high, more than 90%).
They are in the decreasing order of the predicted probability: RDC, Nigeria,
Ethiopia, Rwanda, Nicaragua, Sierra-Leone, India, Zimbabwe, Mozambique
and Romania. Among these 10 countries, two (RDC and Sierra-Leone) were
considered as having experienced a war initiation between 1994 and 1999. Ac-
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cording to the data used in this study, we know also that Ethiopia, Rwanda,
Mozambique, Nicaragua and India had been at war in the precedent 5-year
period. However, a strict analysis should consider that the model fit well for
only two countries and that it was unable to predict any future war. Indeed,
none of the 10 countries has experienced a war initiation in the subsequent
5-year period (2000-2005). Some of them remained however instable. Thus,
we could interpret the output as a measure of risk of instability rather than
as the risk of war initiation.
Predicted probability
of war in 1995
>0.30 (max=0.78)
0.20 - 0.30
0.10 - 0.20
0.00 - 0.10
Figure 1.1: Probability of war, for the period 1995-1999, estimated on the
basis of data from Collier and Hoeffler (2004).
In this category of conflict related studies we should mention the several
studies trying to understand the link between conflict occurrences (or du-
ration) and particular group of factors, e.g. natural resources (Olsson and
Fors, 2004; Lujala et al., 2005; Snyder and Bhavnani, 2005; Urdal, 2005; We-
instein, 2005), demography (Slack and Doyon, 2001), environmental factors
(Toset et al., 2000; Buhaug and Lujala, 2005), etc.
1.2.3 Clustering approach
The purpose of cluster analysis is to place objects into groups or clusters
suggested by the data, not defined a priori, such that objects in a given
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cluster tend to be similar to each other in some sense, and objects in different
clusters tend to be dissimilar. The groups resulting from a cluster analysis
must be meaningful, otherwise the analysis is useless for decision making,
or for phenomenon understanding. We are therefore interested in finding
groups of countries enough separated/separable so that each group can be
associated with one and only one level of conflict risk, and vice versa.
Though it seems to be a simple solution to use clustering methods to clas-
sify countries into different categories of conflict risk on the basis of struc-
tural indicators (economic, social, demographic and environmental indica-
tors), only few studies that have actually used this approach are reported.
In this category, we may cite the works by Wolfson et al. (2004) which tried
to find clusters of states based on their political, economic and conflict char-
acteristics. The study used a dataset of 18 variables and 127 countries,
compiled from four sources:
1. Polity IV dataset: it contains coded annual information on regime and
authority characteristics for all independent states (with greater than
500,000 total population) in the global state system and covers the
years 1800-2003. It’s available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/
polity/.
2. Penn World Table: it provides purchasing power parity and national
income accounts converted to international prices for 168 countries for
some or all of the years 1950-2000 (Heston et al., 2002). It may be
found at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/.
3. PRIO/Uppsala Conflict Data Project: it provides detailed information
on armed conflicts, trends and peace agreements, from 1946 (Gleditsch
et al., 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen, 2005). It is updated each year
and it may be found at http://www.prio.no/cwp/ArmedConflict/.
This study found that some clusters, like those grouping industrialized coun-
tries, were very stable across the time, indicating that some patterns could
be recognized in a consistent way. However, the interpretation of many other
clusters is not clear.
The clustering approach may be relevant for dynamic indicators because
they are mainly based on counting of events. Thus it is straightforward
to compute a distance measure for a such variable. However, the cluster
objects are different if dynamic indicators are used. The dynamic indicators
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clustering try to identify phases of stability/instability for a given country
or group of countries of interest, namely those involved in the same conflict.
For instance, Schrodt and Gerner (1997) applied this approach to an event
data set in attempting to show that these events tend to form temporally-
delineated clusters and that the movement of points in those clusters can be
used as an early warning indicator. The region of interest was the Middle-
East in the period 1979-1996, and the involved countries/actors were Egypt,
Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinians, Syria, United States and Soviet
Union/Russia. They identified a number of phases in the time-series of the
event scores. The phases could be related to particular events that were
particularly highly covered by the media. This study provides actually a
method to find patterns in the time series of events data.
1.2.4 System dynamics modelling
The regression methods presented in section 1.2.2 treat the conflict problem
in a static manner. They consider the effect of socio-economic and environ-
mental factors to the risk of conflict, but they ignore the feed-back effect of
the conflict on the values of those factors. The periods of violent conflicts
are usually removed from the time series data used in regression analysis to
avoid the bias introduced by a such feed-back effect. However, one could ar-
gue that this effect remains for long time after the end of the violent conflict
so that it can not be totally eliminated by simply selecting peaceful periods.
Indeed, the causes and consequences of conflict are highly interconnected.
From this point of view, the risk of conflict should be modelled in a more
dynamic manner.
System dynamics is a methodology for studying and managing complex
feedback systems. Feedback refers to the situation of X affecting Y and Y in
turn affecting X, perhaps through a chain of causes and effects. One cannot
study the link between X and Y and, independently, the link between Y
and X and predict how the system will behave. Only the study of the whole
system as a feedback system will lead to correct results. From a theoretical
point of view, the system dynamics approach seems to be the best suited to
study the link between the risk of conflicts and structural indicators.
Wils et al. (1998) proposed simulations of internal and international vio-
lent conflicts based on their theory of lateral pressure and system dynamics
modelling. Their model was based on four basic indicators on the country
level: the population size, the level of technology (measured by the pur-
chasing power parity per person), the natural resources (measured by the
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land area3) and the military expenditure (as a percentage of the GDP).
They applied the model to seven African countries (Angola, Botswana, Bu-
rundi, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa and Zambia) and 6 countries
members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
– OECD (France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom and
United States). Their model predicts multiple internal conflicts in Burundi
and Rwanda between 1960 and 2060, whereas no conflict is foreseen for the
other countries, because of high internal tensions (due to high population
densities) in the former. It predicts also several international conflicts for all
the OECD countries, except for Sweden, because of their growing population
densities and higher levels of technology4.
The main advantage of the system dynamics approach is that it allows a
clear description of the problem and the interactions between causes and con-
sequences of conflicts. Feedback interactions are not well taken into account
in the other approaches.
However, the advantage of using a system dynamics approach rather than
using classical regressions coupled with a time series forecasting method is
not obvious from this study. System dynamics approach suffers the same
limitations as regression methods, i.e. data quality and availability, and
purely theoretical background of the relationship between the risk of conflict
and structural factors. Furthermore, the specification of parameters and
equations of the system may be highly subjective.
1.3 The international dimension of local con-
flicts
One of the main limitations of current quantitative methods is the country-
level analysis which does not take into consideration external intervention.
In his book on the diffusion of conflict, integration, and democratisation,
Gleditsch argues that the domestic processes within countries, taken in iso-
lation cannot account for the observed variation in distribution of political
democracy over time and space. The likelihood of transitions is strongly re-
lated to changes in neighboring countries and the prior history of the region
(Gleditsch, 2002). As far as armed conflicts are concerned, external inter-
ventions are an almost universally common factor of all so-called internal
3The authors underline that this term is not a precise representation of the resource
notion, but that they used it in the absence of data of other natural resource variables.
4One assumption of the authors states that the technology growth contributes to the
increase of the risk of international conflict.
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conflicts. These interventions are not limited to neighbouring countries. In-
terventions can be direct or consist in different kind of support of one party
in the conflict.
The PRIO dataset contains 31 intrastate armed conflicts in 2005, oc-
curring in 22 countries. A brief review of actors, and admitted/presumed
external interventions in these conflicts reveals interventions including troop
engagement, funding, training providing a territory for training and organis-
ing attacks, and/or diplomatic support in international fora.
1. Philippines vs. CPP: This conflict opposes the Philippines’s governe-
ment and the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). It is founded
on the Marxist-Leninist ideology and affirms to carry revolutionary war
to combat the US imperialism, among others objectives. The US Gov-
ernment considers it as a terrorist organisation. At this level, it is al-
ready clear that this conflict has an international dimension. It should
not be analysed solely in the Philippines national framework. The US
are providing military support to the government forces. Are rebels
also receiving support from a foreign state? The rebel group is active
in the north of the main island.
2. Philippines vs. ASG and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF):
This separatist conflict is taking place on the territory of Mindanao.
The US provide support to governmental troops in this conflict, and,
according to the US Institute for Peace, the MILF received support
from Libya and Malaysia in the 1990s, and had or still has ties with
Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah.5 Libya and Malaysia are indeed still
heavily involved in peace talks between the MILF and the government.
There is external input on both sides in the conflict.
3. India vs. several organisations active in the North-East: These or-
ganisations are the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang
(NSCN-K), the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), the NSCN-K
is a Naga separatist movement and its goal is an independent Nagaland
state (North of India) consisting of all Naga territories (in India and
Myanmar) with a socialist government. The ULFA, which fights for a
sovereign independent state of Assam, is said to receive support from
Pakistan and Bangladesh.6 Another hot point is the Kashmir region,
which is disputed between India and Pakistan.
5http://www.usip.org/fellows/reports/2005/0609_abuza.html
6http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/assam.htm
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4. Myanmar vs. KNPP, KNU and SSA: The Karenni National Progressive
Party (KNPP) is a separatist movement fighting for independent state
of Karen (south-east of Myanmar, border with Thailand). The Shan
State Army on its part fights for an independent Shan state. The Karen
National Union is fighting for Karen people autonomy. A rapid search
of information did not provide evidence of foreign support to rebels or
to governmental troops.
5. Iraq: This is clearly an intrastate conflict driven by external interven-
tion. The internal conditions are far from being the main explanatory
factor.
6. Sudan: The conflicts in Sudan carry also an international dimension in
that sense some rebel groups are said to receive/have received support
from Chad, and others from Uganda. The diplomatic relations between
Sudan and these countries have been troubled by mutual accusations
of supporting rebel groups on both sides as the Sudanese government
is also said to support Chadian and Ugandan rebels.
7. Uganda: see the Sudanese case above.
8. Chad: see the Sudanese case above.
9. Israel: the case is well documented. The palestinian movements receive
support from different states, and the conflict has involved neighbouring
countries at several times.
10. Nepal vs. CPN-M/UPF: This conflict opposes Nepali governmental
forces to the Maoist rebels of the Communist Party of Nepal (CPN-M)
and the United People’s Front. Whereas Nepal is an important piece
in the China-India rivalry, it seems that China did not support openly
the rebel movement while India supported the governmental side. 7
11. Burundi vs. FNL/Palipehutu: Involvement of other countries in this
conflict has been low, but it is known that the burundian rebellion
received full support from Rwanda (until 1994) and Tanzania, and that
they used the DRC’s territory to organise themselves when they began
targeting objectives in the western region of the country.8 9
7http://www.monitor.upeace.org/archive.cfm?id_article=341
8http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1656&l=1
9http://www.iss.co.za/Af/profiles/Burundi/SecInfo.html
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12. Colombia vs. FARC and ELN: This conflict opposes the Colombian
governmental army and two left-wing guerrilla groups, the Revolution-
ary Armed Forces of Colombia (known by their Spanish initials, FARC)
and the National Liberation Army (ELN). The governmental side re-
ceives military and financial assistance from the USA in the framework
of their international narcotics control strategy.10 11 It is not clear if
the rebel side receives also external aid.
13. Ethiopia vs. ONLF: This conflict opposes the governmental army to
the rebels of Ogaden National Liberation Front, which is fighting for an
independent state in the Ogaden region dominated by Somali people.
It has direct connections with the Ehiopia-Somalia conflict.
14. Turkey vs. PKK: This conflict can be viewed as having an international
dimension as the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) has its bases in
Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. The PKK is fighting for independent
state of Kurdistan, comprising part of Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria.
15. Azerbaijan vs. Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. The latter is supported
by Armenia.
16. Afghanistan vs. Taleban: the conflict involves troops of several western
countries on the governmental side.
17. Sri Lanka vs. LTTE: There are some claims that the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) receive support from Eritrea and Indonesia.12.
18. Indonesia vs. GAM (Free Aceh Movement): A rapid search of informa-
tion did not provide evidence/claims of foreign support to GAM rebels
or to governmental troops.
19. Russia vs. Republic of Chechnya: A rapid search of information did
not provide evidence of foreign support to rebels or to governmental
troops.
While bearing in mind this shortcoming, we consider nevertheless that
purely internal factors can provide information on state fragility, high conflict
opportunity and low coping capacity that can be used to estimate the risk
of an armed conflict. The estimates will provide a baseline for experts and
analyst to refine assess the actual risk level.
10http://www.insightonconflict.org/conflict_area/colombia/index.html
11http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/49081.pdf
12http://www.news.lk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=
3328&Itemid=44

Chapter 2
Data issue in conflict studies
In the previous chapter, we underlined the limitations of some quantitative
structural approaches due to lack of suitable data. In this chapter we give an
overview of these limitations. We discuss firstly on the measurement of the
level of country stability or instability (the dependent variable). Secondly,
we review the main data sources for independent (explanatory) variables and
their link with the risk of armed conflict.
2.1 How to measure the (in-)stability of a
country?
Conflict risk assessment studies have usually considered the occurrence of war
as the main variable to analyse. They use a binary variable, i.e. war or no
war. This is the simplest way of quantifying the instability if the value “war”
is clearly defined. Let us consider the civil war case. Scholars have adopted a
working definition of civil war : an internal conflict with at least 1000 combat-
related deaths per year. In order to distinguish wars from massacres, both
government forces and an identifiable rebel organization must suffer at least
5% of these fatalities (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, citing Small and Singer
(1982)).
The Political Instability Task Force (PITF) used a similar binary mea-
sure which included revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, genocides, politicides
and adverse regime changes. The dependent variable had two values “state
failure” and “non-failure” if it experienced or not at least one of the cited
events in the considered year (Goldstone et al., 2000).
If the observation unit is the country, the number of conflicts satisfying
the above definitions –civil war or state failure– each year are actually too
few for robust statistical analysis. In order to overcome this limitation, all
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studies use the country-year combination as the observation unit. This raises,
however, the problem of anachronistic analysis and autocorrelation in the
regressors. The autocorrelation problem may be technically resolved by its
explicit modelling. It remains to verify if the assumption that the mechanisms
behind the violent conflict genesis are similar across time.
The use of a binary variable is convenient for studies on war prevalence
because the use of the well documented logistic regression is straightforward.
However, the limitations of this approach in practical assessment of the risk
of armed conflict, or on the risk of aggravation of on-going “low-intensity”
conflicts, in the context of conflict prevention or humanitarian intervention
have been noted. Scholars have tried to code the intensity of a conflict, war
as well as low-intensity conflict, on an ordinal multilevel scale. For instance,
the KOSIMO database (Pfetsch and Rohloff, 2000) codes the intensity of
conflicts on a 5-level scale. In the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset
(Gleditsch et al., 2002), the conflicts are classified into 3 groups based on
their intensity, that is the number of casualties they have caused.
The instability measure can be operationally substituted with the prob-
ability of war as far as we can assume that the link function is monotonic
and increasing. The estimation of this probability can be carried out on the
basis of the number of on-going wars (frequency approach) or from another
theoretical model (bayesian approach).
2.2 Structural (explanatory) factors
In this section we provide a framework of a conceptual model to estimate
the risk of instability on the country level. The model is based on structural
indicators and could be extended with dynamic indicators and serve as an
operational early-warning system. The dependent variable of the model has
been discussed in section 2.1, this part focuses on the independent variables.
Our aim is to select from the conflict literature the most important struc-
tural features of countries which have experienced armed violence in order
to draw some conclusions about which structural characteristics or factors
increase the probability of conflict. A further aim is to understand the inter-
action of factors using concepts from the main empirical studies. As Vasquez
(2000) points out, this is a complex problem: conflict could be the result of
unique and changing combinations of multiple factors, and there may well be
different causal paths to war where factors that are important in one sequence
have no bearing on another sequence (Levy, 2000). This notwithstanding, the
study will describe the theoretical concepts behind our choice of factors and
connect theories to empirical evidence from the main large-N studies from the
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field of political science and international relations. The main challenge will
be to produce a meaningful overview from studies sometimes using different
definitions, datasets, and methodologies at different levels of analysis.
As our study is concerned with macro level effects on international and
internal conflicts, it will try to draw some conclusions which apply globally,
at country level and over time. The analysis is static, and is limited to the
country level, which means that theories covering the international system
level such as polarity, power balance, system transition are not taken into
account. The relationships between actors in conflict, though extremely im-
portant, have also not been considered in any detail.
To avoid the usual trap of building a theoretical model but useless because
of the lack of reliable data, we will try to use as input those indicators
that are regularly and consistently reported in the different statistics services
of international organizations (UN, World Bank, etc.). The indicators are
grouped into nine categories corresponding to main studied factors of armed
conflicts. They are the political system, state capacity, external influences,
economy, geographical features, demography, human capital, experience of
conflict and environmental features.
2.2.1 Economic indicators
In recent years there have been a large number of quantitative studies ad-
dressing the economic aspects of conflict. Some have been from economists
drawing on concepts from human capital or rational choice theory (Collier
and Hoeffler, 2004; Østby, 2005; Geller, 2000; Brecher et al., 2000). They ar-
gue that poor macro-level economic conditions or their deterioration (growth)
may provide motivation for conflict especially if the costs of rebellion are low.
Two indicators are usually used to account for the economic factor in con-
flict models: the gross domestic product (GDP) and its growth rate. Some
studies suggested also a relationship between trade flows (exports, imports,
foreign investment) and the risk of conflict (or instability).
GDP per capita
Some scholars consider that one of the root causes of violent conflict is the
scarcity of resources. When sufficient resources are distributed equally among
a population, there is no incentive for conflict. The GDP per capita can
measure the level of available resources per capita –sufficiency– but not dis-
tribution equity. It can be also a proxy of the capacity of the country to
manage conflicts. It is almost always included in regression models that we
have reviewed.
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GDP growth
The hypothesis is that when the economic situation worsens, internal ten-
sions rise and the risk of conflict does as well. Among studies including this
variable in their models are for instance Collier and Hoeffler (2002a, 2004);
Fearon (2005); Poe et al. (2006). The effect of this variable is reported to
be consistent as it is shown to be among a set of 18 robust variables ex-
plaining the risk of civil wars in the sensitivity study by Hegre and Sambanis
(2006). However, the change of growth rate does not show particular pattern
for countries having experienced armed conflicts compared to countries of
the same income group (figure ??). The growth rate of unstable economies
change usually varies sharply because when there is an economic shock, the
growth rate reaches very low negative values (less than -10%), and pass again
to about +10% in the next year. In the context of conflict studies, economic
instability should be more meaningfull than the level of economic growth.
Growth rate variance over a given period, longer than two years of course,
could be a usefull indicator.
2.2.2 Socio-demographic indicators
This section gathers variables that are related to demography and human (or
social) development. Some of them could are in somehow identity-related,
but we propose to keep them in this section because they are measured on
the basis of the population distribution among different groups.
Total population
The population size is often included in conflict models as either a control
variable to weigh other variables, or as a factor of the risk of conflict. Indeed,
it is assumed that the risk of rebellion or civil crisis is, ceteris paribus, higher
in large populations than in small populations. Another justification of the
use of the population size in the regression model is that the definition of
armed conflict implies a threshold in battle-related deaths that is more likely
to be attained in large size population than in small size population.
Population density
Some authors have argued that population density is positively correlated
to risk of civil war (de Soysa, 2002; Hauge and Ellingsen, 1998; King and
Zeng, 2001b; Goldstone et al., 2000), but others find that its effect was not
significant (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) or do not include it in their analysis at
all (Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002; Ross, 2006; Urdal, 2004). In Urdal (2005),
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the coefficients of the population density factor in the regression model are
even negative, suggesting that there would be less risk of armed conflict
in countries with high population density. These contradicting conclusions
may be due to model specification and the way that conflicts are coded. As
this variable is easily calculated (from the total population), we propose to
include it in our tests and verify what is its real relationship with the risk of
armed conflict.
Youth bulge
Some studies have tested claims that youth bulges may be causally linked
to internal armed conflicts. The main hypothesis is that countries that ex-
perience youth bulges are more likely to experience internal armed conflict
than countries that do not (O’Brien, 2002; Urdal, 2004). Demography-based
conflict models explain instability as a consequence of an interaction between
the proportion of age groups and the ability of the labour market to absorb
larger, more educated youth cohorts. Urdal (2004) specifies that conflict may
occur in circumstances where employment opportunities are limited after ex-
pectations have been raised from expansion of educational opportunities and
there is little chance to influence the political elite. In his model however,
economic performance turned out to have only a very weak effect on youth
bulge conflict risk. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) disagree with Urdal (2004).
Their thesis is that frustrated young males, with low educational opportu-
nities mean that there is a low opportunity cost (young rebels have little
to lose) of joining rebel movements. Urdal (2004) introduces the notion of
collective group action based on a strong sense of identity and two other
factors from Kahl (1998): lack of peaceful means to bring about change or
express dissent (although youth bulge does not vary in effect with different
levels of democracy) and opportunities for violent actions against the system.
Urdal (2004) also introduces the idea –from Goldstone (2001)– that educated
youth provide a core leadership in popular mobilisation, bridging gaps be-
tween social groups to cause revolts; an explanation which may account for
successful recruitment strategies of rebel groups and terrorist organisations.
Other studies suggest youth bulges interact with ethnicity (Huntington, 1996;
Urdal, 2004; Esty et al., 1998). As a measure of the youth bulge, we will use
the proportion of young people (15-24 years) to the total adult population
as suggested by Urdal (2004).
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School enrollment
This is one of the indicators of human capital. The concept of human capital
describes the contribution made to a society by its people in highly devel-
oped countries. This is said to be the most valuable economic input, also
when financial and natural capital are taken into account. Educated citizens
contribute to strong economy, reflect and support high state capacity and
economic performance. Informed citizens can hold politicians accountable
and choose between political competitors on the basis of credible promises
(Stromberg, 2004; Besley and Prat, 2002; Adsera, 2003). The hypothesis is
that low school enrollment means that a large proportion of young people are
jobless and may be easily mobilised for violent demonstrations and recruited
in military operations (either by the eventual rebels or by government army).
Moreover, they are more vulnerable to propaganda than those who are occu-
pied with studies. We will use mainly the secondary school enrollment rate
because it concerns the category of young people from which propagandist
and rebels try to recruit. Other variables –like years of schooling (King and
Murray, 2001), percentage of population completing tertiary education– have
been suggested but are sparsely covered in open source databases. The liter-
acy rate that is largely used in assessing social development has been rarely
used in conflict models. Apart from the CIFP global index, we did not find
other study including the literacy rate in its analysis.
Infant mortality rate (IMR)
This indicator has been widely used in conflict models as a proxy of social
welfare level (Goldstone et al., 2000; O’Brien, 2002; Harff, 2003; Urdal, 2005)
or a proxy of state capacity (King and Zeng, 2001b). It measures the proba-
bility of a child dying between birth and the age of one, expressed per 1000
live births. Another variable that can be used similarly is the under-five mor-
tality rate where the age interval considered is between birth and five years.
The relationship between the IMR and the risk of armed conflict could be
summarised as follows: high IMR value denotes a low-capacity country, and
as a consequence, higher risk of conflict. The IMR is highly correlated to
the GDP. Both variables are not usually used together in regression models.
Some scholars have preferred the IMR to the GDP as a proxy of state capac-
ity (Urdal, 2005, e.g.) because it should capture better the diverse aspects
of development than the GDP, but it is worth noting that IMR consistent
data were estimated for 10-year periods1.
1More details can be found at http://www.childinfo.org/areas/childmortality/index.php
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Ethnic polarisation
Ethnic differences have been widely discussed as a motivation for conflict
(Horowitz, 1985; Reynal-Querol, 2002; Sambanis, 2001; Vanhanen, 1999; El-
badawi and Sambanis, 2002; Ellingsen, 2000; Urdal, 2004; Collier and Hoef-
fler, 2004; Goldstone et al., 2000; Harff, 2003; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; de
Soysa, 2002, see e.g.). However, quantitative studies report contradicting
results about the importance of the ethnicity in the onset of civil wars. For
instance, Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) found that the ethnic fractionalisa-
tion had a highly significant effect on the prevalence of civil wars, whereas
Fearon and Laitin (2003); Collier and Hoeffler (2004); Montalvo and Reynal-
Querol (2005) found that this effect was not statistically significant. The
model specifications vary a lot so that it is not easy to compare the different
studies. Horowitz (1985), which is a seminal reference on the issue of ethnic
conflict, argues that the relationship between ethnic diversity and civil wars
is not monotonic: there is less violence in highly homogeneous and highly
heterogeneous societies and more conflicts in societies where a large ethnic
minority faces an ethnic majority. If this is so then an index of polarisation
should capture better the likelihood of conflicts, or the intensity of poten-
tial conflict, than an index of fractionalisation. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2005) proposed an index of ethnic polarisation:
RQ = 4
N∑
i=1
π2i (1− πi), (2.1)
where πi is the is the proportion of people who belong to the ethnic group i,
and N is the number of groups. Several studies use an index of fractionali-
sation calculated as follows:
FRAC =
N∑
i=1
πi(1− πi). (2.2)
This formulation of polarisation index is rigid because it depends only on
the demographic composition of groups. A more general index of polarisation
should include a measure of distance between the groups. The distance would
be measured in a chosen dimension(s). In this formulation, a discrete distance
belong/not belong to the group has been used. Thus, this indicator can be
regarded as a measure of potential polarisation. The risk of conflict due
to ethnic polarisation is not constant over time as it depends on the actual
use of ethnicity in explaining the causes of other social problems. Even if
other factors are acting, ethnic differences are used by the groups in conflict
for recruitment and mobilisation of fighters (Weinstein, 2005). Finally, the
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operationalisation of this polarisation index suffers from the poor quality of
data sources.
The most used data on ethnic fractionalisation is the dataset compiled
by the State Geological Committee of the USSR in Atlas Narodov Mira pub-
lished in 1964. The ethno-linguistic fractionalisation (ELF) index has been
built from this atlas, but sometimes authors use also the Encyclopedia Bri-
tannica or the World Christian Encyclopedia. This index has been widely
used but is also criticised by several authors. One of the most shortcoming
of this index, and its source, can be summarized as this: ”Ethnic groups
are now recognized to be social constructions with histories of expansion
and contraction, amalgamation and division. If ethnic groups can grow and
shrink, emerge and disappear, then the ethnic demographies they collectively
define will be fluid. A measure of ethnic diversity built from data collected
in the early 1960s may not accurately reflect the shape of a countrys´ ethnic
landscape several decades later.” (Posner, 2004). Fearon and Laitin (2003)
proposed an alternative measure and dataset of ethnic diversity based on
what he calls ethnic groups that are not limited to cultural and language
differences. He includes a kind of membership consciousness as a criteria of
defining an ethnic group. This measure is quite highly correlated to ELF (cor-
relation coefficient of 0.75) when considering the whole dataset, but there are
large differences concerning North-Africa and Middle-East countries. Pos-
ner (2004) proposed also another index based on Politically Relevant Ethnic
Groups (PREG). The idea was to build a dataset of ethnic groups by country
that are politically relevant. This allows change over time in the proportion
of the groups because some groups can merge or split on political ground.
The work has been done for 48 African countries and from the ethnic groups
that had been firstly described in the Atlas Narodov Mira. The PREG index
is less correlated to the ELF than the Fearon’s index (correlation coefficient
of 0.67). There is not yet a convincing index of ethnic diversity that is suit-
able for conflict studies and the ELF is still widely used despite that it does
not evolve and despite the coding errors existing in its original source.
Religious polarisation
This indicator is quite similar to the ethnic polarisation indicator and the
discussion on the quality of data can be transposed similarly. The most used
data are taken from the Encyclopedia britannica, the World Christian Ency-
clopedia and L’e´tat des religions dans le monde. Collier and Hoeffler (2004)
use a social fractionalisation measure that combines both ethnic and religious
aspects. There is no clear conclusion from quantitative studies on the effect
of religious fractionalisation on the risk of conflict. Reynal-Querol (2002)
2.2. STRUCTURAL (EXPLANATORY) FACTORS 23
finds a positive and significant effect of religious polarisation in explaining
the incidence of civil war, and insists on the use of a polarisation index rather
than a fractionalisation index. It is however worth noting that she limited her
analysis on what are coded as ”ethnic civil wars”. And, surprisingly, some
formulations of the model in the same study (Reynal-Querol, 2002) lead to
a positive and significant effect of the GDP. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2005) finds that the effect of religious fractionalisation/polarisation is not
significant. Their analysis includes all civil wars, not only ethnic wars as in
Reynal-Querol (2002). Ellingsen (2000) finds that religion, as well as eth-
nic and linguistic diversity, has a significant effect when the second-largest
group represents 5%–20% of the population as compared to the case of small
second-largest group (less than 5%), whereas the effect is not significant if the
second-largest group represents more than 20%. This finding is in contradic-
tion with the hypothesis of Horowitz (1985). Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002);
Collier and Hoeffler (2004); Lujala et al. (2005) report also results where the
religious fractionalisation has no significant effect on the incidence or onset
of civil war. In Goldstone et al. (2000), this effect is not significant when it
is tested in the global model. The results of these quantitative studies seem
to contradict the general beliefs on religion-based conflicts.
2.2.3 Resources and their distribution
Vertical and horizontal inequality
There are multiple dimensions of inequality relating social status, educa-
tion and income. Within states this idea can be applied to distribution of
income or non-income resources such as land. Relative deprivation of one
group compared to the other, when perceived by groups as such, reduces
social cohesiveness and increases the risk of between-group conflict. When
”sufficient” resources (absolute amount above a defined level are perceived
to be distributed ”neutrally” (without link to group identity) among a pop-
ulation, there is little incentive for conflict. When political power, territory
or scarce resources are perceived to be disproportionately and systematically
controlled by clearly identifiable groups of a population there is an incentive
for conflict. The most common measure of inequality used so far in quan-
titative studies is the Global Inequality Index (GINI). Unfortunately, GINI
is a measure of vertical inequality, i.e. inequality between individuals, and
is very limited in coverage. There have been conflicting results from both
qualitative and quantitative studies. Collier and Hoeffler (2004); Fearon and
Laitin (2003) find no effect of vertical inequality on conflict onset, but find
a positive effect on duration. Hegre et al. (2003) find no link between in-
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come inequality and conflict onset. Recent quantitative studies have also
constructed measures of between-group inequality or horizontal inequality,
with some finding positive correlations between horizontal inequality and
conflict. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005); Ostby (2005) find ”between-
group” inequality positively correlated with conflict risk. Murshed (2004);
de Soysa and Neumayer (2003); Østby (2005) find ethnically based unequal
social opportunities like education are positively correlated with conflict risk,
more strongly than with economic/asset measures (income, land inequality).
Results seem to depend on the inequality dimension measured and on scale;
group distribution does not usually coincide with state boundaries. There is
no readily available dataset for subnational social opportunity. While this is
a promising approach, there is at present little data on non-income or asset
dimensions of vertical or horizontal inequality, particularly at subnational
level. The only existing dataset is the GINI data at country level.
Natural resources
The control of natural resources like land, water, subsoil resources is probably
the most ancient factor of armed conflicts. It has been simply referred to as
territorial control because natural resources are linked to territory in contrast
to, for example, human resources that are not tightly linked to a territory.
Conflict studies on this topic had been led mainly by the malthusian theory
on resource scarcity (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Renner, 1996). However, recent
studies suggest that the relationship between natural resources and the risk
of conflict depends on the nature of the resources.
A number of studies have shown that the abundance of lootable natural
resources increases the risk of armed conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004;
Le Billon, 2001). By lootable natural resources they mean mainly minerals,
oil, natural gas, timber, and even drug crops and medicinal plants. Collier
and Hoeffler (2004) finds that countries with economy dependent on natural
resources are at high risk of civil war, as lootable resources allow rebels to
generate conflict financing. They introduced a measure of dependence on
natural resources which is the ratio between primary commodity exports and
GDP. The measure covers exports of minerals, oil, coal, natural gas, crude
materials, beverages, tobacco as well as agricultural products (Fearon, 2005).
This study raised much debate in the political scientist community due to
its major policy implications. According to Fearon (2005), the Kimberley
Process to end trade in ”conflict diamonds” is an important policy initiative
consistent with the argument of Collier and Hoeffler (2004). Elbadawi and
Sambanis (2002); Fearon (2005); Hegre and Sambanis (2006) show that the
results from (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) are not robust.
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Other studies focused on specific natural resources like oil (Fearon, 2005;
Ross, 2004, 2006), diamonds and other precious stones (Lujala et al., 2005;
Ross, 2004; Snyder and Bhavnani, 2005). These provide alternative interpre-
tation of the widely accepted explanation that some rebellions are motivated
by the opportunity of lootable resource, but the results are not robust enough
for generalisation. For instance, Ross (2006) notes that “the association be-
tween Primary diamonds and civil war is quite robust. Still, civil wars in
diamond-producing states are quite rare, which should make us exceedingly
cautious about generalisations. Of the 90 civil wars that began between
1960 and 1999, only 12 took place in countries that produced diamonds
in nontrivial quantities. Of these 12, only 7 happened in 3 countries that
produced primary [and secondary] diamonds2: the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC), Russia and South Africa”. The other 5 civil wars occured in
4 countries that produce only secondary diamonds: Angola, Liberia, Sierra
Leone and Central African Republic. Furthermore, it is questionable if the
civil wars in Russia and in South Africa were primary motivated by the con-
trol of diamonds. Even in the DRC, the civil war of 1996 is not likely to have
been motivated by the control of the natural resources. Rather, it may be
more accurately described as a continuation of the Rwandan civil war.
However, we can not reject the control of natural resources as a factor of
armed conflict, not only in civil wars, but also interstate wars. The conflict
and killings that took place in the beginning of the colonisation period (end
of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th) were clearly driven by the
search for natural resources. The ongoing wars in the Middle East can be
also linked to the control of oil resources. The secession wars in the DRC also
are examples of conflicts that can be regarded as attempts to control mineral
resources, where internal rebel groups as well as foreign mineral companies
and governments are involved. However, as mineral resources are never the
only factor and cases where the lootable resources are the main cause are rare,
it is difficult to derive valid inferences. The same remarks can be formulated
about ethnic and/or religious diversity.
The risk of conflict related to the abundance of natural resources seems
to be conditional upon government effectiveness. We could test the use of a
conditional regression model but there are too few documented cases. Data
on natural resources are very disparate and imprecise, and the most used
proxies are more appropriate to proxy other concepts. The most commonly
used measure is the ratio of primary commodities exports to the GDP; both
variables are generally reported in the World Bank’s database. This ratio can
2Primary diamonds are mined from kimberlite shafts whereas secondary diamonds are
scattered over alluvial plains
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be actually interpreted as the measure of the dependence of the country’s
economy to the primary sector. High values of this measure denote weak
economies. Other studies tried to split the primary commodities pool and
use specific measures for each natural resource. Fearon (2005) suggests to
use fuel exports (available in the World Bank’s database) share in the GDP,
Lujala et al. (2005) uses dummy binary variables indicating if and when
diamonds have been found and exploited in producing countries. Humphreys
(2005) uses diamond production (in metric carats) and the oil production and
reserve (in barrels), compiling data from reviews of professionals involved in
the extraction of diamonds and oil. Ross (2006) uses diamond production
per capita (in USD/person) data from Humphreys (2005) and goes into more
details by specifying if they are primary or secondary diamonds. de Soysa
(2002) uses the stock of natural capital (in USD) which measures the entire
environmental patrimony of a country; the data comes from the World Bank’s
database. These examples illustrate the difficulty to generalise from results
of different studies with different measures.
2.2.4 Geographical context
The geographical context is a key factor in the course of armed conflicts, and
its study has been clearly taken into account in interstate conflict studies.
Several theories and conceptual frameworks have been developed to explain
the geographical factors in armed conflicts. Stephenne and Ehrlich (In re-
view) proposed a comprehensive review of these studies. In this part, we dis-
cuss mainly indicators (measures) that are usually employed to operationalise
the geographical concepts. There is a set of indicators that measure the prox-
imity of the conflict actors. Considering interstate conflicts, we can cite the
distance between the capitals (Lemke, 1995), the minimum distance between
the borders of each pair of countries provided this distance is less than 950
km (Gleditsch and Ward, 2001), contiguity or shared borders (Richardson
and Wright, 1960), length, number and nature (constraint elements, civil
and military infrastructure near the border, etc.) of borders (Wesley, 1962;
Starr and Thomas, 2002; Furlong et al., 2006), terrain characteristics like its
roughness (Buhaug and Lujala, 2005; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon and
Laitin, 2003; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Starr and Thomas, 2002)
and land cover (Buhaug and Lujala, 2005; de Rouen and Sobek, 2004).
Proximity and nature of the border
Brecher et al. (2000); Brecher (1993) maintain, that spatial contiguity and
proximity increase interactions and opportunities (willingness) for war. Hensel
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(2001) counters this argument by maintaining that any pairs of stated are
more likely to fight over territory, including states that border each other.
Huth and Allee (2002) argues that ethnicity interacting with territorial claims
involving groups that spread across borders, are most prone to escalate to
war, and is supported by Brecher et al. (2000). Gleditsch and Ward (2005)
further introduces the notion of ethnic, political, economic transnational link-
ages. Gleditsch et al. (2002); Sambanis (2001); Ward and Gleditsch (2002);
Esty et al. (1998) have all discussed the notion of conflict contagion but the
specific factors unclear. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) speculated about arms
availability, which would affect all countries in region equally.
However geographical factors measuring the proximity can not be used di-
rectly to assess the risk of conflict in a country. The attempt to use these fac-
tors is usually driven by their positive correlation with the frequency of armed
conflicts because interstate wars are more likely between neighbours than be-
tween distant countries (Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2006; Mousseau et al., 2003;
Russett et al., 2000). The results of regression models are not robust, how-
ever. For instance, Furlong et al. (2006) find that the existence of shared river
has a significant effect on the probability of MID when considering a very
large period (1880-1992), but the effect disappears for a shorter time period
(1980-1992). Moreover, they find that the border length effect is not signifi-
cant contrary to the results of Starr and Thomas (2002). The latter considers
that rather than the nature of the border being important, the length of the
border is the primary distinguishing factor between conflict borders and non-
conflict borders. The longer a border is, the greater the opportunity for in-
teraction and, therefore, conflict. We think that what matters is the diffusion
of the conflict from one country to another, and the propensity to conflict
escalation when there is any incompatibility between countries sharing a bor-
der. Thus, the number and the political situation (stability/instability) of
the neighbours should be more important than the length of the border. This
formulation can also be applied to internal armed conflicts, whether inter-
nationalised or not, in the framework of a global model. The nature of the
border can be captured by quantifying its permeability for military opera-
tions in a similar way as Stephenne and Pesaresi (2006) modelled the border
permeability to illegal crossings. It seems difficult to use detailed characteri-
sation of the neighbourhood of each country in a global model. For this, we
need data on indicators of the neighbourhood of each country. Some simple
indicators can however be set up: binary variables indicating if there is an
armed conflict in the neighbourhood, if the country is a potential target of
one of the actors of the conflict in neighbouring countries. We will use only
the former variable –based on armed conflict database– because getting data
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on the latter variable implies reviewing the history of all countries, a task
that is beyond the scope of this paper.
Terrain characteristics
It is generally known that rebel groups are more often based in mountainous
and/or densely forested areas, not easily accessible to governmental forces.
Several studies made the hypothesis that the proportion of zones with high
difficulty of access is correlated to the risk of civil war in the country. In
this respect, Fearon and Laitin (2003) found that mountainous terrain is
significantly related to higher rates of civil war whereas Collier and Hoeffler
(2004) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) found that the terrain effect
was not significant, nor was the forest coverage effect. Again, quantitative
analysis provides inconsistent results with reference to a “generally known”
fact. This can be attributed in part to the way the analysis is done. Buhaug
and Lujala (2005) point out the scale effect in studies involving geographical
factors, and propose to take into account the exact location of the conflicts.
However, this study concludes that conflict zones are –contrary to general
belief– less mountainous and forested than the countries in which they occur.
Buhaug and Lujala (2005) found that a mountainous terrain tends to extend
the duration of civil wars. Almost all these studies used the proportion of
mountainous areas within a country. We think that the area of mountainous
zones is a more appropriate measure because the rebel groups need some
territory to operate regardless what percentage this territory represents in
the country. The area of mountainous zones should be more appropriate
but it does not account for the location of the mountainous zones. If these
zones are far from the capital (especially near the border), they offer more
opportunity for rebellion hosting than if they were near the capital. Thus,
we propose to use an index of accessibility from the capital. It is calculation
is explained in section 2.3.3.
2.2.5 Regime type
Democratic peace theory is one of the most influential schools of thought in
international relations. It holds that mature democracies are more peaceful
than autocracies, both in their interactions with other democracies and in-
ternally (Oneal and Russett, 2005; Ray, 2000; Vasquez, 2000). The age of
democracy seems to be significant, with three years given by some studies
as a threshold for maturity (Russett, 1993; Rummel, 1997). The quality of
democracy in the region also seems to make a difference.
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Regime type affects conflict likelihood, with political representation hav-
ing a negative effect on risk of war (Gleditsch and Hegre, 1997; Russett,
1993). Countries with a middle-level democracy or countries in transition
either towards democracy or autocracy have a higher probability of suffering
a civil war. These findings are consistent with Collier and Hoeffler (2004),
Sambanis (2001), Russett et al. (2000), Hegre et al. (2001) and Ellingsen
(2000).
The intuition behind these results is firstly, that for starting a civil war
some level of freedom is needed to let people organized and secondly, that the
opportunity costs of rebellion are higher in more inclusive systems Reynal-
Querol (2002). In highly democratic and highly autocratic countries there
is more certainty about possibility to effect political change and thus little
incentive for conflict. There has been little examination of representative-
ness of the various forms of democratic government, as high heterogeneity
among democracies (plural, proportional, high/low electoral margins) makes
generalisation and comparison very difficult.
However, Hegre (2002) show that the political system effect tends to
become insignificant when controlling for income. Similar results are reported
by Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) and Ostby
(2005). This is probably due to the strong correlation between democracy
score and income.
The level of democracy that is extracted from Polity IV dataset3 is by far
the most used data source for regime type indicator. It is coded in 20 levels
(from -10 to 10) where the score -10 is given to absolute autocracy and +10 to
full democracy. The evaluation is based on six variables that are assumed to
characterise the level of democracy of the regime: (i)regulation of executive
recruitment, (ii)competitiveness of executive recruitment, (iii)openness of ex-
ecutive recruitment, (iv)executive constraints, (v)regulation of participation
and (vi)competitiveness of participation. The values given to these variables
are based on judgments of the authors of the dataset and may be question-
able. As an alternative, the new dataset on political institutions from the
World Bank may be useful. It provides six governance composite indicators
based on several “independent” sources4, for every two years between 1996
and 2004.
3http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/
4http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/wp-governance.htm
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2.2.6 History of armed conflict
It is generally assumed that countries having experienced an armed con-
flict are prone to another conflict because either the contention has not been
completely resolved, the after-conflict regime has low capacity to contain new
insurgency, the issue of the conflict generated new dispute topics and also
because of the experience of organising armed conflicts that people acquired
during previous wars. Brecher et al. (2000) claims that protracted conflicts,
with repeated crises between pairs are more likely to end in war. A number
of studies have found, that a higher number of parties involved in a multi-
party dispute brings a higher likelihood of war (Vasquez, 1993; Cusack and
Eberwein, 1982; Brecher, 1993). States with violent independence struggles
are also found to be at higher risk of crises leading to war.
The conflict history factor is sometimes confused with the factor of time-
dependence of the risk of conflict if a country has been at war previously.
For instance, Raknerud and Hegre (1997) take into account all disputes in
which force has been used, and all recurring disputes between pairs. They
construct a measure of years since last conflict divided by years at peace
since first data point (time dependency), with conflict effect decaying rela-
tive to a half time parameter. This variable that Mousseau et al. (2003) call
brevity of peace equals 2−x/A, where x is the number of years after the end
of the last conflict, and A is the “half-life” parameter. Leng (2000), Hensel
et al. (2000), Mousseau et al. (2003), and Gleditsch and Ward (2005) set the
parameter A to 5 years. Urdal (2005) considers that the effect of previous
conflict is decaying over time following a negative exponential function. He
assumes, that the decay rate parameter is 4, implying that the risk is halved
approximately every 3 years5. Furthermore, he argues that different speci-
fications of this function, i.e. different values of the rate parameter, do not
change the results of his analysis. These approaches aim normally to correct
for the trend in the probability-of-war time series, and are applied on the
dependent variable. The problem is that with binary series, there is no way
to assess the correlation structure of the observations without events (peace-
ful years). We propose to estimate separately the risk related to the history
of armed conflicts rather than including it in the structural model. We can
therefore assess the effect of the structural conditions and the effect of past
conflicts independently. Each module can be tuned independently. Details
of the method are given in section 3.4(page 40).
5Both formulations are actually equivalent excepted that there is a factor of Ln(2)
between the “half-life” parameter values
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2.3 Overview of the main data sources
This study relies exclusively on open source data collected by international
organizations or by research centres. For armed conflict data, we use the
PRIO dataset. For independent variables, the World Bank is a major con-
tributor through its annual reports on World Development Indicators. This
section reviews the different indicators, the extent of available data, their
completeness, and eventually their statistical properties.
2.3.1 Armed conflict database
The PRIO dataset contains data on armed conflicts since 1946. They are
classified into four categories: interstate, internal, internationalised internal
and extra-systemic. Interstate conflict occurs between two or more states;
internal conflict occurs between the governement of a state and one or more
internal opposition group(s) without the intervention of other states; inter-
nationalised internal conflict occurs between the government of a state and
one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states
on one or both sides; and, extra-systemic conflict occurs between a state and
a non-state group outside its own territory. In this study, we retained two
categories, internal and internationalised internal conflicts. These categories
are more likely to be related to structural factors of the country that the
conflict targets. The time range was limited to 1971-2005 because most of
the structural indicators lack information on the previous period.
Every year, on-going conflicts are recorded with their location (country),
approximative start date, intensity, type, engaged parts, etc. The location
country and the year of reporting were retained as the main fields for further
analysis. We are indeed interested in the relationship between the structural
characteristics of a country and the probability of an armed conflict. In this
dataset, location is actually defined as the government side of a conflict, and
should not be interpreted as the geographical location of the conflict. How-
ever, for internal and internationalized internal conflicts, only one country
name is listed. This is the country whose government or territory is dis-
puted. For certain conflicts, such as in the Kurdistan, the disputed territory
is divided between different countries. They have been coded as different
conflicts for each country.
At this stage, the actors are not included in the modelling. This may
however be questionable. For instance, if we consider the Iraqi conflict since
2003, it is clear that the internal conditions could not alone explain (predict)
the risk of the conflict. Moreover, the PRIO dataset records an interna-
tionalized internal conflict for 2001, 2002, 2004 and 2005, between the USA
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and Al-Quaeda, with the USA as location. We considered this conflict as
an extra-systemic conflict and excluded it from the list because it involves a
state (USA) and a non-state group (Al-Quaeda) outside the USA territory.
The number of countries that are affected by internal conflicts each year
is depicted in figure 2.1. This number ranges from 15 in 1973 to 34 in 1992.
Since 1992, it is diminishing and in 2003 it was on almost similar level as
in the 1970s’. Its increase in the beginning of the 1990s’ is related to the
collapse of the Soviet Union.
Figure 2.1: Number of countries involved in at least one armed conflict.
2.3.2 World Development Indicators
The World Bank publishes every year the largest compilation of data about
development. The 2006 edition of World Development Indicators includes
more than 900 indicators for 208 entities (states and territories)6. We used
6For details, see http://www.worldbank.org/data
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this dataset for all data on economic and socio-demographic indicators. How-
ever, many indicators miss data for several countries and several years. The
most complete variable is the total population by country and by year. Data
for this variable are primary derived from national population censuses and
estimates based on demographic models. The GDP is a key economic indi-
cator which is well covered in the WB datasets. It’s usually missing for few
cases.
Other indicators extracted from this dataset are:
Merchandise exports : the value of goods provided by a country to the
rest of the world. In the framework of conflict studies, this indicator
can be considered as a proxy of the openness of a country and the state
of its economy.
Exports of goods and services : exports of goods and services as a per-
cent of GDP represents the value of all goods and other market services
provided by a country to the rest of the world, as a percentage of its
gross domestic product (GDP). Exports include the value of merchan-
dise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees, and
other services, such as communication, construction, financial, infor-
mation, business, personal, and government services.
Merchandise imports : the cost, insurance, and freight value of goods
received from the rest of the world. In the framework of conflict studies,
this indicator can be considered as a proxy of the openness of a country
and the state of its economy. It can reflects also the level of confidence
of the economic operators in the country.
Imports of goods and services : imports of goods and services as a per-
cent of GDP represents the value of all goods and other market services
received by a country from the rest of the world as a percentage of its
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Imports include the value of mer-
chandise, freight, insurance, transport, travel, royalties, license fees,
and other services, such as communication, construction, financial, in-
formation, business, personal, and government services.
Fuel exports : fuel exports as a percent of merchandise exports is the per-
centage of the total value of all merchandise leaving a given country’s
borders attributable to fuel commodities.
Total external debt : that is debt owed to nonresidents of a country re-
payable in foreign currency, goods, or services. This variable was lim-
ited to developing countries. Relevant observations of this variables
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are completely covered. Missing values on the country-year list were
therefore set to zero. These missing cases are for example developed
countries, years before independence/existence of the country.
Foreign direct investment : foreign direct investment is net inflows of
investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or
more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other
than that of the investor.
Official development assistance and official aid : net official develop-
ment assistance consists of disbursements of loans made on concessional
terms and grants by official agencies of the members of the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC-OECD), by multilateral institutions, and
by non-DAC countries to promote economic development and welfare
in countries and territories in part I of the DAC list of recipients. Net
official aid refers to aid flows from official donors to countries and ter-
ritories in part II of the DAC list of recipients: more advanced coun-
tries of Central and Eastern Europe, the countries of the former Soviet
Union, and certain advanced developing countries and territories. This
indicator can be a proxy for the dependence level of a country to ex-
ternal assistance, and denote a risk of weak institutions. This variable
was limited to developing countries. It was set to zero for developed
countries, i.e. members of the Development Assistance Committee of
the OECD.
Secondary school enrollment : the gross enrollment ratio is defined as
the total school enrollment, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage
of the school-aged population. Data are available for years 1999 to
2004 and 1990. We used linear interpolation to estimate the school
enrollment for the years which have not reported, between 1990 and
1999. The case of missing data for reporting years is discussed in section
3.2 devoted to the treatment of missing data.
As noted in section 2.2.5, the World Bank published a dataset on political
institutions that can be used to study the effect of the regime type on the
risk of armed conflict. This dataset contains six composite indicators: voice
and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption. It covers
213 countries and territories for 1996, 1998, 2000, and annually for 2002-2005.
Details about these indicators are given in Kaufmann et al. (2006). We used
this dataset for validation (see 4.4).
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2.3.3 Terrain accessibility index
We defined an accessibility index based on terrain characteristics. The un-
derlying hypothesis is that the opportunity of hosting a rebellion or other
military activities that are hostiles to a country is greater on rough terrain,
far from the capital and near the border. For each point in the country,
we calculate the distance from the capital, weighing it for terrain roughness.
The terrain roughness is measured by the range of elevation values within
a 7 × 7 window. We used the DEM from the GTOPO30 dataset7, in Plate
Carre´e projection (equidistant cylindrical projection), with a pixel size of
930 m (=30 arc-seconds at the equator). The index was calculated at the
same ground sampling distance.
Formally, this index can be regarded as a geodesic distance from a pixel
to the source point, i.e the capital. The geodesic distance d(p, q) between two
pixels p and q in a connected domain S is defined as the length of the shortest
path from p to q which is totally included in the domain. A path between
pixels p = p1 and q = pn is defined as the ensemble P = {p1, p2, . . . , pn}
so that pi and pi+1 are connected neighbors for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 1}, and pi
belong to the domain for all i. The path length l(P ) is defined as
l(P ) =
i=n−1∑
i=1
dE(pi, pi+1), (2.3)
where dE is the euclidean distance between adjacent pixels. The distance dE
is equal to the pixel size for the vertical and horizontal neighbours, and to
√
2
times the pixel size for the diagonal neighbours. In our case, we introduce
a cost ci to pass through pixel i, which is simply its value in the elevation
range data. Equation 2.3 becomes
lc(P ) =
i=n−1∑
i=1
ci + ci+1
2
dE(pi, pi+1). (2.4)
We further constraint the distance calculation within a polygon defining
the territory of a country. The borders are introduced in the process as
barriers. However, it is not possible to calculate the geodesic distance on the
entire land territory of some countries, like Indonesia, that are made up by
several non-connected parts. We used the index of the polygon containing the
capital, and in most of the cases, this polygon was by far larger than the other
components of the country territory. Notable underestimation can be noted
for Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, New Zealand, Japan and Danemark.
7http://edc.usgs.gov/products/elevation/gtopo30/gtopo30.html
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Figure 2.2 shows a global map of raw index values, whereas figure 2.3
shows the average index values by country. These average values are finally
used as accessibility indicator (variable geog) in the regression model. Other
summary statistics at the country level (range and standard deviation) were
highly correlated to the mean so that we kept only the mean values for further
analysis.
Distance index
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Figure 2.2: Distance index from the capital by country, weighted by terrain
roughness
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Figure 2.3: Average distance index values by country
Chapter 3
Method
3.1 Variable selection and experimental
design
Most empirical conflict studies aimed to predict the probability of conflict
onset based on a set of risk factors. In that case, the dependent variable is
commonly coded 0 for all country-years records with no war, 1 for the year
a war started, and missing for periods of ongoing war (Hegre and Sambanis,
2006; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Beck et al., 2000; Goldstone et al., 2005; Ben-
nett and Stam, 2000), whereas some authors code these periods as 0 (Fearon
and Laitin, 2003). Other studies consider modelling the incidence of armed
conflict and the dependent variable is coded 1 for periods of ongoing war
(Reynal-Querol, 2002; Elbadawi and Sambanis, 2002; Hauge and Ellingsen,
1998; Urdal, 2005). The first approach seems to be theoretically the most
appropriate if one is interested in modelling the probability of conflict onset,
that is the risk of a new “country-conflict”. However, in practice, it turns
out to be unfeasible. Firstly, the start and end dates of a conflict are not
always obvious because the PRIO datasets records a conflict when and only
while it reaches the death threshold. Secondly, removing periods of ongoing
war reduce the sample, and specially the number of cases. This is critical
because the number of cases is already small. For instance, we have 843 cases
in total between 1971 and 2004 whereas there were only about 70 new cases,
compared to about 7600 total country-years records. Some scholars argued
that the different approaches gave similar results at least when studying the
effect of particular factors (Urdal, 2005; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006), but did
not provide details of their evidence. In this study, we preferred the third
design and coded as ones all ongoing war periods.
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Our dependent variable Yit takes value 1 if the country i is experiencing
one or more armed conflict(s) in year t, and takes value 0 otherwise. The in-
dependent variables that initially we selected are the GDP per capita (gdpc),
GDP growth (gdpg), merchandise exports (expm), exports of goods and ser-
vices as a percent of GDP (expgdp), merchandise imports (impm), imports of
goods and services as a percent of GDP (impgdp), fuel exports (expf), foreign
investment (inve), official development assistance par capita (odac), official
development assistance as percentage of Gross National Income (odag), total
external debt (debt), total population (popu), population density (pdens),
population growth (pgro), secondary school enrollment (secs), religious frac-
tionalisation index (ref), religious polarisation index (rep), ethno-linguistic
fractionalisation index (elf), ethno-linguistic polarisation index (elp), democ-
racy level (democ) and accessibility index (geog). Summary statistics of these
variables are provided in table 4.1.
We checked the distribution of all the variables and when it departures
far from the normal distribution, we took a transformed variable. They
were then standardised to mean 0 and variance 1. For some variables, some
observations were missing because they had not been reported in the data
sources at our disposal. For example, if exports data are missing for a country
and for some years, we can reasonably assume that this country actually
exported for some value those years, but did not report the statistics. We
can therefore try to find a way to gather this information or to estimate the
missing export values. The next section discusses a little bit this topic. In
other cases, data are missing because the combination variable-country-year
is not relevant. For example, the countries of the former soviet republics
that became independent in the 1990’s lack information on most economical
indicators before 1990. Such entries are therefore kept empty or set to zero.
3.2 Imputation of missing data
Missing data is very common phenomenon in social sciences because the
main data sources are inquiries. In our case, we work with data provided
either by national statistical services to international organizations or with
data collected by different institutions in the framework of activities that are
not related to conflict studies. The list of countries and the periods that are
covered by these datasets vary widely. The national statistics services do not
report or publish regularly their data. This happens more often for countries
with low capacity governments, those indeed that are more prone to political
instability. Removing cases with missing data on one or more indicators can
therefore exclude a significant number of important cases. List wise deletion
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may bias results because the remaining data may not be representative of
the total sample. An alternative simple and widely used method to handle
missing data was the substitution of the missing observations by plausible
values (location statistics or regression predictions). This method tends to
parameter standard errors that are too small, p-values that are artificially
low, and rates of type I error that are higher than nominal levels.
Instead of filling in a single value for each missing value, multiple imputa-
tion (Rubin, 1987) replaces each missing value with a set of plausible values
that represent the uncertainty about the right value to impute. The multi-
ply imputed data sets are then analyzed by using standard procedures for
complete data and combining the results from these analyses. Missing values
for any variable are predicted taking into account the correlation between
all variables used in the imputation model. Multiple imputation preserves
therefore the relation between variables, and accounts for uncertainity in the
model by creating different complete datasets. Several methods can be used
in multiple imputation, depending on the pattern of missingness. For a data
set with a monotone missing pattern, one can uses for example the regression
method. A monotone missing pattern is not necessary guaranteed. With an
arbitrary missing pattern (either monotone or not), a Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) method (Schafer and Olsen, 1998) that assumes multivariate
normality is used to impute all missing values. We used the MCMC method
to impute all missing data because the pattern of missingness was not mono-
tone. We created 5 versions of imputed data sets, and combined the results
of their analysis.
3.3 Modelling the risk related to structural
factors
Let Y be the dependent variable. If π is a measure of the risk of state
instability, and λ a threshold of instability over which an armed conflict will
occur, the dependent variable for a country j can be defined as follows:
Yj =
{
0 if πj < λ,
1 if πj ≥ λ
(3.1)
Thus, Yj ∼ Be(pj), with pj being the probability of an armed conflict in
countryj. The parameter pj = P (πj ≤ λ) can be regarded as a value of the
cumulative distribution function of πj . We need to predict Yj on the basis
of some explanatory variables Xj = (X1j , X2j, ..., Xrj). Assuming that Y is
fully discribed by a Bernoulli law, it is sufficient to have an estimate of the
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parameter p. The parameter of the Bernouilli distribution p is frequently
modelled with a logistic function.
p =
exp(β ′x)
1 + exp(β ′x)
(3.2)
where β is the vector of parameters and x is the matrix of explanatory vari-
ables. The subscript j in the previous formula and notations must be under-
stood as referring to a country-year observation because we have decided to
do a panel analysis instead of a cross-sectional analysis.
3.4 Modelling the risk related to previous con-
flicts
Countries that experience an armed conflict are more prone to an other
conflict in the future. This effect is usually taken into account by including a
variable that reflects the history of conflicts (Mousseau et al., 2003; Gleditsch
and Ward, 2005; Urdal, 2005). Our objective is to estimate the risk of armed
conflict. In that sense, we propose to separate the effect of past conflicts
from the effect of other independent variables. We propose to model the risk
related to past conflicts in a innovative way inspired by capture-recapture
methods used in Ecology studies (Jolly, 1982; Seber, 1982).
We consider Ω the set of World countries, and its subset C of countries
that are prone to armed conflict for a given short period (one year or five
years for example). We constraint our analysis on limited period in the
history, say for example from 1971 to 2005. The number of countries in the
World is generally more or less stable during the considered period with some
exceptions like the dissolution of the USSR. The number of elements in C
cannot be known in advance. We know only that it is between 0 and the
cardinal number of Ω. However, the cardinal number of C has been up-to
now much smaller than the one of Ω as it can be seen on figure 2.1.
Let’s consider that a country becomes element of C if it has experienced
an armed conflict at any time in the period of interest. The set C can be
regarded as a semi-open space because it allows individual to become member
but does not allow them to get out. We explain later how this constraint
could be relaxed. Let’s define some notations and parameter relationships.
The subscript i will refer to time, while j refer to country. We recall that Yij
takes value 1 if the country j is at war in year i (another time unit could be
used also), and 0 otherwise.
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si : the total number of countries at war in year i.
si =
n∑
j=1
Yij. (3.3)
mi : the number of countries that are ”at war” in year i and have previously
experienced at least one armed conflict.
mi =
n∑
j=1
Yij if Yij = 1 and ∃k < i|Ykj = 1. (3.4)
zi : the number of countries that have experienced an armed conflict be-
fore year i, they are not ”at war” in year i, but are reported to have
experienced another conflict later.
zi =
n∑
j=1
Yij + 1 if Yij = 0 and ∃k < i, l > i|(Ykj = 1, Ylj = 1).
(3.5)
ri : the number of countries ”at war” in year i that are reported to be
again/still ”at war” at any later period.
ri =
n∑
j=1
Yij if Yij = 1 and ∃k > i|Ykj = 1. (3.6)
Si : the total number of countries that are prone to armed conflict in year
i. One should expect this number to be equal to the total number
of countries in the international system (about 200 countries), but the
experience has showed that armed conflicts occur in a much less number
of countries each year. This number can not be directly observed. It
needs to be estimated.
Mi : the theoretical number of countries that have previously experienced
an armed conflict ad are prone to another conflict in the future. In
other words, this is an estimate of the number of countries in year i
that could return to armed conflict in the future because they are more
prone to armed conflicts than others.
pi : the probability that an armed conflict in a country member of the set
C in year i. This probability is based only on occurences of armed
conflicts and its modelling does not include any ancillary information.
pi =
si
Si
=
mi
Mi
(3.7)
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We are interested in the estimate of this probability.
A maximum likelihood estimator of pi is:
pˆi =
mi
Mˆi
, (3.8)
where
Mˆi = mi +
sizi
ri
. (3.9)
Thus,
pˆi =
miri
miri + sizi
. (3.10)
The estimator is however biased. Seber (1982) recommended to correct
it as follows:
Mˆi = mi +
zi(si + 1)
ri + 1
, pˆi =
mi(ri + 1)
mi(ri + 1) + zi(si + 1)
. (3.11)
Similarly, we can estimate the total number of countries that are prone to
armed conflicts as follows:
Sˆi =
Mˆi(si + 1)
mi + 1
. (3.12)
We calculated these parameters from the PRIO dataset. We estimated
the risk αkj related to previous conflict as follows. Let’s consider the first
year i a country has experienced a conflict (Yij = 1), and k > i so that
Ykj = 0. Then,
αkj =
l=k∏
l=i
pl (3.13)
Finally, the overall risk was the average between the risk related to pre-
vious conflicts (αij) and the risk related to structural factors (πij). The com-
bination of both risk estimates could also be done by taking the maximum,
max(αij ,πij), instead of the average of the two estimates.
Chapter 4
Results
4.1 Variable distribution exploration
As a first step, we provide a brief description of the variables distribution.
Summary statistics are shown in table 4.1, while figures 4.1 and 4.2 summa-
rize the distributions of the explanatory variables before standardization and
imputation of missing values.
From table 4.1 it can be noted that some variables could not be used
in the model at all because the missing data proportion is too high. We
excluded variables that lack data for more than 20% of the observations
in the conflict cases. These variables are expf , gdppc and secs. Location
statistics of most factors are in the line of the expected trends, even if the
differences in mean values are often small in comparison with their standard
deviation. As for the indicators of religious fractionalisation and polarisation,
their mean values are lower in ”conflict” than in ”non-conflict” cases.
The boxplots (figures 4.1 and 4.2) reveal also some interesting information
regarding the hypotheses that are usually posed in conflict studies literature.
The GDP per capita is, as expected, lower in the “conflict” sample than in
the “non-conflict” sample. The latter shows however larger variability. This
raises indeed the usual question of causal relationship between poverty and
armed conflicts. Secondly, the GDP growth distributions do not show signif-
icant differences between “conflict” cases and “non-conflict” cases, whereas
substantial differences can be noted for the indicators related to commercial
exchanges, share of imports and exports of merchandise in the GDP. Coun-
tries that are involved in armed conflicts participate in commercial exchanges
less than others. Moreover, reduction in trade flows could indicate lack of
confidence of economic operators that is often related to political instability.
43
44 CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
Table 4.1: Summary statistics of the explanatory variables and the World Bank’s stability index
Conflict Nomiss Miss (%) Mean Median Std
gdpc 1 745 11 2148 787 4011
0 4497 32 5789 1910 8126
gdpg 1 738 12 0.0 1.6 7.6
0 4583 31 1.8 2.0 6.0
expm 1 828 1 10284 1472 24131
0 4997 25 19984 1049 66593
impm 1 826 2 10993 2154 25600
0 4988 25 20505 1383 75248
expf 1 498 41 16.6 2.6 32.8
0 3278 51 17.4 3.1 29.0
expgdp 1 725 14 23.6 20.4 15.2
0 4329 35 37.2 31.9 23.6
impgdp 1 725 14 29.1 25.4 16.1
0 4327 35 44.1 37.6 24.9
inve 1 808 4 724 33 3539
0 4707 29 1858 23 11215
odag 1 738 12 5.9 2.4 9.1
0 4272 36 7.3 2.3 12.8
odac 1 815 3 29.9 13.4 53.9
0 4761 28 69.8 18.8 195.6
debt 1 717 15 16767 4083 31275
0 3787 43 7535 909 22477
popu 1 839 0 59279 18380 156551
0 6542 1 18751 3234 85944
gdppc 1 667 21 3246 1872 3920
0 3801 43 6976 4083 7692
secs 1 39 95 40.3 48.0 28.6
0 560 92 64.7 72.0 25.8
REF 1 839 0 0.40 0.43 0.23
0 5537 16 0.44 0.47 0.23
REP 1 839 0 0.57 0.64 0.26
0 5537 16 0.62 0.71 0.26
ELF 1 835 0 0.50 0.51 0.23
0 5322 20 0.42 0.42 0.25
ELP 1 835 0 0.59 0.64 0.20
0 5322 20 0.54 0.60 0.25
democ 1 839 0 0.03 0.00 6.32
0 6626 0 0.20 0.00 6.08
geog 1 838 0 34.96 22.94 36.01
0 4678 29 31.35 18.29 39.79
stability 1 117 86 -1.32 -1.35 0.75
0 774 88 0.20 0.26 0.87
Note: The total number of observations was 7465, among which 839 (11%) conflict cases (ones in the
second column).
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Figure 4.1: Summary of the distributions of the explanatory variables. See
text for the explanation of the symbols. (continued)
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Figure 4.2: Summary of the distributions of the explanatory variables (2).
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The official development assistance data (odag and odac) do not show
differences in their distribution between “conflict” and “non-conflict” cases
even if the median values do not differ. They both show higher variability
in “non-conflict” than in conflict cases. This is because the former category
includes countries with very different level of economic development, from
the poor peaceful countries like Niger, Mali, etc. to emerging rich developing
countries like Brazil, Saudi Arabia, China, etc. Especially, the new economic
and demographic giants like China, Brazil and India receive insignificant
amount of ODA/GDP or ODA per capita. The debt service tends also to be
higher for conflict cases.
Again, indicators of social (ethno-linguistic and religious) fractionalisa-
tion and polarisation are quite similar in their distributions for both sam-
ples, especially location parameters of the polarisation indices. The ELF
index tends however to be higher in the conflict cases, but this is almost
masked in the polarisation index.
4.2 Regression analysis
We considered several specifications of the model and data processing in
order to select the method that offers the best trade off between quality of
fit and completeness in the possibility of prediction. We began with the
naive model, including all the explanatory variables and using the original
dataset before imputation of missing values. The observations with at least
one missing variable were excluded from the analysis. The results of this first
analysis are reported in table 4.3. They show that the likelihood of armed
conflict is significantly associated with the GDP growth rate, the ODA per
capita, the ODA per unit of GDP, the level of foreign investment, the size of
the population, the level of democracy and with the different indices of social
fractionalisation/polarisation, excepted for the ethno-linguistic polarisation
index. The overall model fitting statistics denote an acceptable model. The
coefficient of determination R2, adjusted according to Nagelkerke (1991),
of 0.28 is an acceptable value in social sciences. The Hosmer-Lemeshow
statistics (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000) is enough small (not statistically
significant) denoting an overall good fitting.
However, when we examine the coefficient estimates of the different re-
gressors, we can note some “inconsistencies” with our initial hypotheses. The
sign of the coefficient of lodag (ratio ODA/GDP) is negative (less assistance
is associated with higher risk of armed conflict) whereas the sign for lodac
is positive (more assistance is associated with higher risk of armed conflict).
We expected similar signs for both variables. The religious fractionalisa-
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics of the explanatory variables after transformation, standardisation and
imputation of missing values
Conflict Nomiss Miss (%) Mean Median Std
lgdpc 1 839 0 -0.52 -0.51 0.86
0 5369 19 0.03 0.00 1.02
gdpg 1 839 0 -0.19 0.01 1.16
0 5369 19 0.02 0.04 0.97
lexpm 1 839 0 0.13 0.18 0.82
0 5369 19 -0.03 -0.05 1.03
limpm 1 839 0 0.14 0.10 0.82
0 5369 19 -0.03 -0.14 1.03
lexpf 1 839 0 -0.05 -0.27 1.12
0 5369 19 -0.09 -0.22 1.09
lexpgdp 1 839 0 -0.52 -0.45 0.92
0 5369 19 0.10 0.16 1.02
limpgdp 1 839 0 -0.51 -0.54 0.89
0 5369 19 0.14 0.13 1.06
inve 1 808 4 -0.04 -0.22 0.90
0 4707 29 0.01 -0.24 1.01
lodag 1 839 0 0.00 -0.09 0.83
0 5369 19 0.01 -0.10 1.00
lodac 1 839 0 -0.13 -0.09 0.72
0 5369 19 0.02 0.15 1.02
ldebt 1 839 0 0.47 0.56 0.75
0 5369 19 -0.16 0.05 1.04
lpopu 1 839 0 0.80 0.79 0.55
0 6542 1 -0.10 0.12 1.00
lgdppc 1 773 8 -0.50 -0.51 0.87
0 4777 28 0.00 0.03 1.01
secs 1 39 95 40.31 48.00 28.56
0 560 92 64.72 72.00 25.82
lref 1 839 0 -0.16 0.25 1.17
0 5503 17 0.02 0.35 0.97
lrep 1 839 0 -0.17 0.27 1.20
0 5503 17 0.03 0.38 0.96
lelf 1 833 1 0.30 0.48 0.70
0 5290 20 -0.05 0.30 1.03
lelp 1 833 1 0.24 0.45 0.63
0 5290 20 -0.04 0.37 1.04
democ 1 839 0 0.03 0.00 6.32
0 6626 0 0.20 0.00 6.08
lgeog 1 838 0 0.19 0.23 0.88
0 4678 29 -0.03 0.04 1.01
stability 1 117 86 -1.32 -1.35 0.75
0 774 88 0.20 0.26 0.87
Note: The total number of observations was 7465, among which 839 (11%) conflict cases (ones in the
second column).
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tion index has also an “unexpected” negative coefficient whereas the asso-
ciated polarisation index coefficient is in the expected direction. Montalvo
and Reynal-Querol (2005) observed the same pattern and interpreted this as
meaning that, conditional on a given degree of polarization, more religious
diversity decreases the probability of a civil war. Indeed, a high number of
different groups increases the coordination problems and, therefore, given a
level of polarization, the probability of civil wars may be smaller.
Another “inconsistency” with our initial hypotheses is that the coefficients
of most of the economic indicators (income, exportation and importation vol-
umes, debt service) are not statistically significant at 5% level. Some have
either “unexpected” signs. Thus, lgdpc, lexpm and limpm are not signifi-
cant but have the expected sign, whereas ldebt is not significant and has an
“unexpected” sign. This is may be due to multicollinearity problem.
We found also that the observations of several countries in recent years
(namely in 2004, the last reporting year) were discarded because of missing
data. We could speculate on the availability of data in the future, but this
is a factor that we can not control. We tested the model with a dataset
augmented by imputation of missing data.
The imputation model was mainly based on the expected correlation be-
tween economic indicators. However, we excluded the variable inve from
the analysis because it was not used in the imputation model. We should
underline that the results of a model similar to the one presented in table
4.3 don’t almost change inve is put aside. This may indicate that the test of
significance of its effect may not be valid probably because its distribution
is highly skewed as it can be seen on figure 4.1. The results of the imputed
dataset are summarised in table 4.4. Statistics of goodness-of-fit are less
good than in Model 1. The coefficient of determination is lower (0.22) and
the Hosmer-Lemeshow statistics is higher, even statistically significant at 5%
level. Factors with significant effect are almost the same: GDP growth rate,
official development assistance, population size, relegious fractionalisation,
ethno-linguistic fractionalisation, and democracy level. Only the religious
polarisation factor lrep is not significant in Model 2 whereas it was in Model
1, and vice-versa for lexpgdp (share of exportation of merchandise in the
GDP). The “inconsistencies” we noted in Model 1 are also present in Model
2. Coefficient estimates have the same sign, and they are quite similar for
both model as it can be seen on figure 4.3. The largest changes are noted
for the intercept, gdpg, lexpm, lodac, lpopu, lref and lrep. The number of
imputations has no effect on the model estimates. If the calculation load
is an issue (large dataset for example), single imputation will be prefered
to multiple imputation. A more detailed sensitivity analysis should allow
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Table 4.3: Parameter estimates of the full model using the original dataset,
and its goodness-of-fit statistics (Model 1)
Parameter DF Estimate Standard Error Wald χ2 p−value
Intercept 1 -6.6480 1.8170 13.3872 0.0003
lgdpc 1 -0.1797 0.1242 2.0957 0.1477
gdpg 1 -0.0505 0.0093 29.6620 < .0001
lexpm 1 -0.0646 0.1389 0.2165 0.6417
lexpgdp 1 -0.3451 0.2400 2.0677 0.1504
limpm 1 -0.2978 0.1633 3.3250 0.0682
limpgdp 1 0.2983 0.2911 1.0500 0.3055
lodag 1 -0.4351 0.1501 8.4027 0.0037
lodac 1 0.3248 0.1140 8.1162 0.0044
ldebt 1 -0.0065 0.0331 0.0391 0.8432
inve 1 -0.00003 0.000014 4.7356 0.0295
lpopu 1 0.9650 0.1429 45.5839 < .0001
lref 1 -1.3843 0.2411 32.9514 < .0001
lrep 1 1.2756 0.2648 23.2026 < .0001
lelf 1 0.3071 0.1510 4.1367 0.0420
lelp 1 -0.0985 0.1942 0.2571 0.6121
democ 1 0.0282 0.0086 10.7950 0.0010
lgeog 1 -0.0312 0.0539 0.3360 0.5621
Observations (1/0) 623/3003
Log likelihood -1330
Wald χ2 447.06
Adjusted R2 0.28
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 6.16
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Table 4.4: Parameter estimates of the full model using the imputed dataset,
and its goodness-of-fit statistics (Model 2)
Parameter DF Estimate Standard Error Wald χ2 p−value
Intercept 1 -2.7931 0.0877 1013.6268 < .0001
lgdpc 1 -0.2099 0.1202 3.0492 0.0808
gdpg 1 -0.2392 0.0437 29.9952 < .0001
lexpm 1 -0.1759 0.2743 0.4111 0.5214
lexpgdp 1 -0.3364 0.1240 7.3596 0.0067
limpm 1 -0.4914 0.2637 3.4718 0.0624
limpgdp 1 0.2224 0.1225 3.2944 0.0695
lodag 1 -0.7090 0.1377 26.5158 < .0001
lodac 1 0.7959 0.1446 30.2963 < .0001
ldebt 1 -0.00104 0.0822 0.0002 0.9899
lpopu 1 1.9908 0.1640 147.4034 < .0001
lref 1 -0.4548 0.1846 6.0673 0.0138
lrep 1 0.2555 0.1810 1.9909 0.1582
lelf 1 0.3387 0.1179 8.2602 0.0041
lelp 1 -0.0514 0.1177 0.1910 0.6621
democ 1 0.0335 0.00687 23.7944 < .0001
lgeog 1 -0.0937 0.0511 3.3560 0.0670
Observations (1/0) 832/4141
Log likelihood -1896
Wald χ2 513.35
Adjusted R2 0.22
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 18.97*
documenting the variability of the model parameters and the exact effect of
missing data imputation.
From a statistical point of view, Model 1 should be preferred to Model
2. However, the model based on imputed dataset can provide estimates of
conflict probability for more countries than the one based on the original
dataset. If we consider the estimates of 2004, Model 2 provides predictions
for 157 countries out of 226 countries/territories whereas Model 1 provides
predictions for only 103 countries out of 226 countries/territories. This is an
important advantage for operational application.
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Figure 4.3: (A)Comparison of coefficient estimates of Model 1 (no-
imputation) and Model 2 (single imputation), and (B) the effect of the num-
ber of imputations (right).
4.2.1 Alternative specifications of the model
We noted that some factors had unexpected coefficient values in the full
models that are detailed in the previous section. We tried alternative speci-
fications of the model, trying to reduce any multicollinearity effect.
Firstly, we avoid to use at the same time variables that are expected
to measure the same driving force. For example, when the variable lexpm
that measures the exportation volume is entered into the model, then limpm
is put aside, and vice-versa, because they are supposed to proxy the trade
openness of the country.
This is a subjective variable selection method that rely on the experience
of the analyst. We could base the selection on more objective criteria, like
explanatory power of the variables. We use a forward stepwise procedure,
starting with the simplest model including only the intercept. Next, the
procedure computes the chi-square score statistic1(McCullagh and Nelder,
1989, p. 393) for each variable not in the model and examines the largest
of these statistics. If the score statistic is significant at the specified level
(we took α = 0.05), the variable is added to the model. After a variable is
1The score statistic is the log-likelihood derivative. In this case, the derivative is taken
with respect to each candidate variable. It has an asymptotic χ2 distribution with r degrees
of freedom under the null hypothesis, where r is the number of the tested parameters.
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added, the new model is tested and any variable that does not produce a
significant effect at the specified level, as measured by the Wald chi-square
statistic (Kendall et al., 1991, p. 869), is removed. The procedure stops
when no variable satisfies the entry condition and all variables in the model
have a significant effect. We assume that factors that are highly correlated
should not stay in the model together because one of them will necessary be
insignificant.
An other approach is to replace original variables by their principal com-
ponents. The principal components regression has been indeed used by
several authors to deal with multicollinearity among explanatory variables
(Massy, 1965; Aguilera et al., 2006; Wold et al., 1984; Heij et al., 2007).
In usual principal components analysis, fewer components than the num-
ber of original variables are selected based on the amount of variance they
convey. For regression analysis, the components are selected according to
their explanatory power in the model by using the stepwise selection method
described in the previous section.
Results for the alternative specifications of the model
Table 4.5 lists some of alternative models we tested based on subjective se-
lection of factors. Five models are reported and differ in the number of
variables included. We keep continuous numbering of the models from sec-
tion 4.2, so that the first model in the following table is number three. In
Model 3 we keep aside the variables which had ”unexpected” sign in Model 2,
lodag, lref and ldebt. Indeed, lodag is highly correlated to lodac(r = −0.81),
lexpm (r = −0.80), limpm(r = −0.77) and ldgpc(r = −0.73). We should
note also that lref is highly correlated to lrep(r = 0.96) as expected. How-
ever the correlation of ldebt to other variables is rather low. In model 4 we
remove lexpm which is highly correlated to limpm (r = 0.90), and in Model
5 we exclude limpgdp, and in Model 6 we separate polarisation and fraction-
alisation indices. We test also a model based on economic indicators only
(Model 7) to assess the possibility of setting a baseline of risk that can be
tuned afterwards by taking into account other factors.
The results of table 4.5 show that the alternative specifications lead to
quite similar results with regards to overall fitting quality of the model. The
suspected multicollinearity effect is evidenced for some factors even if it
doesn’t seem to affect substantially the overall results. We can note that
limpm becomes highly significant when lexpm is not in the model whereas
both factors are not significant in the full model (Model 2) and in Model 3.
Similarly, when lref (and lelf) is removed, lrep (and lelp) becomes highly
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Table 4.5: Alternative specifications of the regression model
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Intercept -2.793** -2.770** -2.775** -2.753** -2.748** -2.233**
lgdpc -0.210 0.058 0.062 0.038 0.018 -0.795**
gdpg -0.239** -0.241** -0.239** -0.234** -0.239** -0.219**
lexpm -0.176 -0.186 -0.199
lexpgdp -0.336** -0.152 -0.214** -0.144** -0.136* -0.257*
limpm -0.491 -0.455 -0.612** -0.591** -0.598** 0.808**
limpgdp 0.222 0.046 0.102 -0.150
lodag -0.709** -0.274*
lodac 0.796** 0.386** 0.390** 0.418** 0.411** 0.219
ldebt -0.001 0.334**
lpopu 1.991** 2.022** 2.023** 1.967** 1.969**
lref -0.455*
lrep 0.256 -0.198** -0.199** -0.195** -0.184**
lelf 0.339** 0.158 0.147 0.126
lelp -0.051 0.138 0.147 0.159 0.269**
democ 0.034** 0.028** 0.029** 0.028** 0.027**
lgeog -0.094 -0.080 -0.079 -0.078 -0.081
Wald χ2 513.352** 490.192** 490.206** 490.267** 488.916** 529.169**
Adj. R2 0.221 0.207 0.207 0.206 0.206 0.189
H-L χ2 18.968* 34.510** 38.337** 42.868** 39.279** 25.647**
significant. It seems that the multicollinearity effect is noticeable when the
correlation coefficient is greater than 0.90.
We run the model where fractionalisation indices were put aside keeping
only the polarisation indices and we found that the results were similar to
ones of Model 6. This confirms that both indices measure actually the same
phenomenon and they are interchangeable. This result is contrary to the
conclusion of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and Reynal-Querol (2002)
who argue that the polarisation index is more appropriate than the frac-
tionalisation index. The most interesting thing is that Model 7 (based on
economic indicators only) performs almost as well as Model 2 (full model)
whereas it is more parsimonious. In this model, the income factor (lgdpc)
becomes highly significant. The general goodness-of-fit statistics are slightly
different except for the coefficient of determination.
Results for stepwise variable selection
Starting with the full model with 16 variables (Model 2), the selection proce-
dure resulted in a 10-variable model (referred to as Model 8 hereafter), with a
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Wald χ2 of 505.1, an adjusted R2 of 0.22 and H-L χ2 of 13.03 (not significant
at 5% level). The fact that model assessment statistics are close to, even bet-
ter than, those of the full model indicates that some factors are redundant or
don’t add much in the explanation of the response variability. The variables
that are retained in the final model are lgdpc, gdpg, lexpm, lexpgdp, lodag,
lodac, lpopu, lref , lelf and democ. Variables that were firstly seen as can-
didates for removal from the model on the basis of their correlation to other
variables remain in the model. It is worth noting however that the correlation
coefficients of these variables with the remaining factors are below 0.90. This
is in line with the observation made in the previous paragraph and tends to
confirm that the multicollinearity effect may be a problem for correlations
stronger than the 0.90 level. The signs of the coefficients of these retained
variables are consistent with those reported for Models 1 and 2, confirming
their robustness. The case of lodag and lodac merits further comments.
We noted that higher values of the share of the development assistance in
the GDP are associated with lower probability of armed conflicts. The rela-
tionship is opposite about the development assistance per capita. This can be
interpreted with two assumptions: (i) very poor countries whom economies
depend for a large part on foreign assistance are less prone to armed con-
flicts because there is little incentive to engage an armed conflict, or have no
resources to spend at expensive military operations. These countries receive
actually small amount of aid per capita compared their richer counterparts.
(ii) Countries which receive high amount of development assistance per capita
are those that are in transitional situation and/or constitute strategic and
geopolitic interests of rich countries. These countries are more prone to
armed conflict and military operations that can, in turn, be supported by
the development assistance funds. These countries are not necessary the least
developed ones. This interpretation is in line with findings by McGillivray
and Noorbakhsh (2004) and by Kosack (2003) about the relationship between
aid and the human development index. They found that aid was negatively
associated with HDI values, and the sign of the coefficient was robust against
several alternative specifications.
To illustrate our interpretation, let us look at plots of development as-
sistance indicators evolution over time for Sudan (high strategic/economic
interest and middle-income group member) and Mali (low strategic interest
and low-income group member)(figure 4.4). In the case of Sudan, there is
small difference between lodag and lodac levels in comparison with other
recipients, whereas the difference is larger in the case of Mali. The Mali’s
pattern is typical of low income group countries, whatever their political
situation. The trend of Sudan’s time series plot is observed mainly with
countries with strong central government and relatively good economy that
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experience rebellion conflicts without falling into total chaos (Indonesia, Sri
Lanka, etc.).
However, when we look at a scatterplot of lodag and lodac while separat-
ing the conflict and no-conflict cases (figure 4.5, top), we can observe that
the extent of no-conflict cases in the high values of development assistance
indicators is larger than for the conflict cases. It does not seem that conflict
cases have higher values of lodac than no-conflict ones. We can suspect an
interaction with another factor in the model. When we replace lodag by
lpopu (population size indicator), we see that there is indeed a tendency to
high values of lodac for conflict cases (figure 4.5, bottom).
Results for principal components regression
The selection of components to use in the regression model lead to 9 out of 16
principal components. It is worth noting that the components retained in the
model (Model 9) are not necessary ordered according to their eigenvalues. For
instance, in the final model we have the first, second and seventh components,
but not the others in between (3rd to 6th). Not surprisingly, the overall
statistics of model quality were similar to those of the reduced model obtained
from the variable selection procedure: a Wald χ2 of 507.3, an adjusted R2 of
0.22 and H-L χ2 of 8.6 (not significant at 5% level). The nine components that
we retained account for 63% of the total variance in the explanotory variables.
The principal component approach and the stepwise varable selection method
can be equally applied. The latter method has however the advantage that
it is readly interpretable whereas the PC approach does not have necessary
a clear intepretation in terms of inital variables. On the other hand, the PC
method could be advantageous in case of high mutlicollinearity.
4.2.2 Receiver operating characteristics curves
Another means of quality assessment for logistic regression models with bi-
nary response is the receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve. The fit-
ted model allows to calculate the event probability (probability of an armed
conflict in this case) for each observation (each country-year entry in our
model). If the predicted probability exceeds some threshold, the observation
is predicted to be an event observation, otherwise is a nonevent. Different
classifications can be obtained from the same model by varying the cutpoint
value. The classification accuracy can be measured by its sensitivity which
is the proportion of event responses that were predicted to be events (true
positive rate), and its specificity which is the proportion of nonevent re-
sponses that were predicted to be nonevents (true negative rate). A ROC
4.2. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 57
Figure 4.4: Official development assistance indicators from 1971 to 2004 for
Sudan (top) and Mali (bottom). Plotted values have been standardised after
taking their logarithm and may contain imputed values.
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Figure 4.5: Official development assistance as percent of the GDP (lodag),
and population size (lpopu), vs. official development assistance per capita
(lodac) for conflict (1) and no-conflict (0) cases. Plotted values have been
standardised after taking their logarithm.
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Figure 4.6: ROC curves of models that are most promising. The under-curve
area is almost similar for the four curves (0.77).
curve plots the sensitivity as a function of 1-specificity (false positive rate)
as the predicted probability threshold is varied. It is used to represent on a
ROC graph the line of random guess (line of no-discrimination) which lies
on the diagonal line. The ROC curve is normally convex and the area under
it measures the overall classification accuracy that the model could provide.
More the ROC curve is far from the diagonal, better is the model. The
ROC curve can also be used to decide the cutpoint value in the predicted
probability if one is interested in a binary response output. The cutpoint
will be a tradeoff between sensitivity and specificity. High sensitivity will be
related to higher risk of false positives (higher risk of predicting erroneously
a conflict) whereas low sensitivity raises the risk of false negatives (higher
risk of missing to predict a conflict which occurred).
The graphics of figure 4.6 show ROC curves of four candidate models,
Models 2, 7, 8 and 9. The four models are quite similar, with slightly higher
sensitivity of Models 2 and 9 in the zone of best compromise between sensi-
tivity and specificity. The differences are however too tight so that we can
consider them equivalent on the ground of the ROC curves.
From these model assessment, we can conclude that the best alternative
model to the full model (Model 2) is Model 9 which is obtained by selecting
variables that have most explanatory power. This model has the advantage
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on Model 2 of parsimony and therefore it should be less affected by missing
values because it is based on less variables. The question now is to know if
we can build the predictive model based on selected variables only for further
works. In other words, is the set of selected variables robust enough or just
driven by data? We can partially answer the question based on theoretical
considerations.
The variables that are retained in this model can be grouped into 5 cate-
gories: (i) economic indicators that measure the economic development level
(thus state capacity to control growing conflicts); (ii) trade indicators that
measure the openness and the inter-dependency of economies of different
countries; (iii) indicators of development assistance that measure the depen-
dency of economy to foreign aid and therefore its weakness and vulnerability
to other countries willing; (iv) indicators of social fractionalisation; and (v)
indicator of level of democracy which is an evaluation by experts of the po-
litical capacity of a state to handle internal problems. The indicator of level
of democracy constitutes a way to take into account subjective assessment
of political situation which can not be quantitatively measured. Its score de-
pends heavily on the history of the country and on several past events that
had not necessary affected significantly other indicators. It can be subject
to serious bias however, if the experts involved in the assessment are not
really independent. The link of these factors to the risk of armed conflict
has been largely reported in previous studies, even though the relations were
not systematically found robust. This is specially the case for the social
fractionalisation indicators whom the effect has been discussed heavily by
scholars.
4.2.3 Risk predictions based on structural indicators
We postulate that the process of conflict genesis and resolution takes more
or less long time (at least five years) so that we can use data collected some
years ago. We consider that results of the model fitted on data covering
the period up to 2004 should hold for the period of the following five-year
period, i.e. 2005-2010. We report hereafter results obtained mainly with the
Model 9, and sometimes with the full model (Model 2) for comparison. We
estimated the probability of armed conflict for the country-year observations
without missing data for all the variables in the model. This is an important
limitations because the estimates of countries that have not reported data
to the international organisations (due to total collapse of the state or due
to economic and diplomatic sanctions) are not reliable at all. Some of such
countries are Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, Somalia and the
former Yugoslavia. Estimated probabilities for selected periods are mapped
4.2. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 61
Projected risk of armed 
conflict for 2000
No data
Low (<10%)
Medium (10-20%)
High (20-30%)
Very high (>30%)
Figure 4.7: Risk of armed conflict in 2000 estimated with Model 9 (see text
for details on the model).
on figures 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9. With these periods, we can assess the consistency
of our model through time for the recent past. In fact, we present results for
2004 because it is the last year for which data are available. We compare
them to those of 2003 and of 2000 only for the sake of brevity, but the
main conclusions should not have changed if we had chosen other periods.
Similarly, we present estimated probability time series for some countries.
To help reading these maps, we list in table 4.6 the top 20 countries with
high estimated probability for armed conflict occurrence. There are 15 coun-
tries that are in the top 20 for the three reported years. This show that
the model is consistent over time. These maps show a number of things
that can appear strange on the first view. One could ask why countries like
China, India, Brazil, Turkey and South-Africa are reported to have high risk
of armed conflict whereas they are usually seen as stable. In fact, all these
countries, along with Indonesia and Nigeria have large populations and rela-
tively low GDP per capita and have experienced at least one armed conflict
–according to the definition we adopted in this study– in the recent past. For
instance Turkey has been on war for several years against the PKK (Kurdis-
tan Worker’s Party) rebellion; several ”small” conflicts have been active up
to now in India; Indonesia and Nigeria also have their domestic rebellions
still active. The estimated high risk for China and Brazil is obviously due to
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Figure 4.8: Risk of armed conflict in 2003 estimated with Model 9 (see text
for details on the model).
Projected risk of armed 
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Figure 4.9: Risk of armed conflict in 2004 estimated with Model 9 (see text
for details on the model).
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Table 4.6: Top 20 countries ranked according to the projected risk (πij) of
internal armed conflicts in 2000, 2003 and 2004
2000 2003 2004
Country πij Country πij Country πij
India 0.79 India 0.70 India 0.71
Afghanistan 0.58 Afghanistan 0.64 Pakistan 0.52
Indonesia 0.54 Indonesia 0.56 Morocco 0.49
Congo, Dem Rep 0.53 Ethiopia 0.56 Indonesia 0.45
Pakistan 0.52 Pakistan 0.49 Colombia 0.45
Turkey 0.47 Colombia 0.44 Nigeria 0.43
Ethiopia 0.47 Brazil 0.42 Niger 0.43
Morocco 0.46 Kenya 0.42 Kenya 0.43
Brazil 0.44 Bangladesh 0.40 Bangladesh 0.41
China 0.43 Peru 0.40 Congo, Dem Rep 0.40
Tanzania 0.41 Morocco 0.39 Peru 0.40
Bangladesh 0.41 Liberia 0.38 Nepal 0.39
Egypt 0.41 Turkey 0.38 Brazil 0.38
Nigeria 0.40 Egypt 0.36 Turkey 0.37
Colombia 0.40 Nepal 0.36 Mali 0.37
Nepal 0.39 Myanmar 0.35 Burkina Faso 0.36
Kenya 0.38 Congo, Dem Rep 0.35 Guatemala 0.36
Niger 0.37 South Africa 0.34 Tanzania 0.36
Thailand 0.37 Guatemala 0.34 Egypt 0.36
Peru 0.37 Tanzania 0.33 Ethiopia 0.34
their large populations because they did not experience any internal armed
conflict since 1971, whereas the high risk for Tanzania is obviously due to its
very poor economic performance.
Another interesting information that can be derived from the results of
this model is to analyze the trend of the risk of armed conflict for a country
over years. Such time series plots are shown on figures 4.10–4.12. We took ex-
amples of large asian countries, countries rich in mineral and fossil resources,
countries that are recovering from severe wars (Angola and Mozambique)
and countries that did not experience internal armed conflict while their
neighbours, with which they share many characteristics, have been heavily
affected (Kenya and Tanzania).
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Figure 4.10: Evolution of the risk of internal armed conflict from 1971 to
2004 for some countries. The ISO codes are as follows: IDN for Indonesia,
PAK for Pakistan, CHN for China and IND for India.
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Figure 4.11: Evolution of the risk of internal armed conflict from 1971 to
2004 for some countries. The ISO codes are as follows: BOL for Bolivia,
NGA for Nigeria, AGO for Angola and MOZ for Mozambique.
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Figure 4.12: Evolution of the risk of internal armed conflict from 1971 to
2004 for some countries. The ISO codes are as follows: KEN for Kenya,
SDN for Sudan, COD for Democratic Republic of the Congo and TZA for
Tanzania.
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4.3 Risk related to previous conflicts
The probability that an armed conflict occurs in a country (for the period
1971-2004) was estimated on the basis of occurrences of conflict previously
observed. As explained in section As it can be seen on figure 4.13, this
probability was almost constant for different years during the cold war period
(until 1991), diminished a little bit around 1995 and became raising again in
early 2000s’. This means that on the global level, the probability to observe
an armed conflict has been almost constant for several years, with a mean
value of 0.73 and a mode of 0.78 (most likely value). Another interesting
thing to observe on this figure is that the end of the cold war period is
marked by a pick in the number of countries at war (si) and in the potential
number of countries prone to armed conflict (Sˆi) whereas the probability pˆi
of risk related to previous conflict is on the minimum. This means that this
period marked a change in the pattern of armed conflicts. If we examine
the different components of the number of countries at war each year (figure
4.14), we can note that in that period there are more new armed conflicts
than other years while the number of resolved conflict in the same period is
relatively low. Moreover, in the following years, we observe less new conflicts
and more resolved conflicts. It is important to understand that what we put
in the category of resolved conflicts the countries that were at war during
the year under consideration and that have not yet returned to war at the
end of the studied period, i.e. 2004. The probability pˆi takes into account
this and does not necessary follow the trend of si, the number countries at
war. A number of countries that resolved their conflicts between 1990 and
1995 did not return to conflict afterward.
For each country and for each year, we estimated αij the probability of
conflict due to the conflict history by applying formula 3.13. The values of
pi at the first and last years (1971 and 2004) could not be directly estimated.
They were replaced by the mode value. We finally took the average value
between the probability estimated with Model 9 (structural factors) and that
related to the history of conflicts. This can be regarded as the overall risk of
armed conflict given the socio-economic situation of the country in the recent
past. Figures 4.15 to 4.17 show average probabilities for some countries
as comparison with figures 4.10 to 4.12. We can note that the effect of
previous conflicts is well marked for countries like Angola, RDC and Sudan
for which the probabilities calculated form the structural indicators model
were relatively low. Similarly, the overall risk for China becomes much lower
than for India because the latter has had armed conflicts for almost all the
period under consideration.
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Figure 4.13: Evolution of the probability of armed conflict based on the
history of conflicts (pˆi), the frequency of armed conflicts (si), estimate of
the number of countries prone to armed conflicts (Sˆi), and estimate of the
number of countries that are prone to two or more episodes of armed conflict
(Mˆi).
4.3. RISK RELATED TO PREVIOUS CONFLICTS 69
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
19
71
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
Resolved conflicts
Temporary resolved conflicts
Ongoing conflicts
New conflicts
Figure 4.14: Evolution of the total number of countries involved in or are
prone to an armed conflict each year with a breakdown into different cate-
gories (new, resolved, temporary resolved and ongoing conflicts). Note that
some categories can not be calculated for the first and last years (1971 and
2004, respectively). For instance, it is not possible to calculate the number
of new conflicts in the first year of the period under consideration, and the
number of resolved conflicts for the last year.
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Figure 4.15: Evolution of the risk of internal armed conflict from 1971 to
2004 for some countries. The ISO codes are as follows: IDN for Indonesia,
PAK for Pakistan, CHN for China and IND for India.
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Figure 4.16: Evolution of the risk of internal armed conflict from 1971 to
2004 for some countries. The ISO codes are as follows: BOL for Bolivia,
NGA for Nigeria, AGO for Angola and MOZ for Mozambique.
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Figure 4.17: Evolution of the risk of internal armed conflict from 1971 to
2004 for some countries. The ISO codes are as follows: KEN for Kenya,
SDN for Sudan, COD for Democratic Republic of the Congo and TZA for
Tanzania.
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Figure 4.18: Risk of armed conflict in 2004 as estimated with Model 9 (see
text for details on the model) and adjusted for the effect of previous conflicts.
We present on figures 4.18 and 4.19 maps of risk of armed conflict in 2004
as estimated in this study. We recall that the estimates for some countries
must be interpreted with caution as they socio-economic data were actually
sparse. This is especially the case for Iraq and Afghanistan. The model can
be updated easily as new data become available. The first map depict the risk
on a continuous scale whereas the second shows countries classified into four
groups with breakpoints defined as follows: low risk (< 10%), medium risk
(10− 20%), high risk (20− 30%) and very high risk (> 30%). In the context
of armed conflicts, we are talking about rare events (the cases represent 7%
of the observations), and probabilities greater than 20% can be ragarded as
already high (King and Zeng, 2001a). We used this
On the basis of these results, we can note that the ten countries with
highest risk are in the order India, Indonesia, Colombia, Nigeria, Nepal,
Turkey, Ethiopia, Uganda, Sudan and Philippines. All these countries have
indeed strong central governments that have been challenged for a long time
by different kind of rebellions. They will perhaps never explode into total
war and collapse, but they remain in somehow fragile. We think however
that the model overestimate the risk for India and Turkey. Their estimates
are systematically high for the last 20 years, even 30 years for India. In the
same time they showed a remarkable economic development. These countries
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Figure 4.19: Risk of armed conflict in 2004 as estimated with Model 9 (see
text for details on the model) and adjusted for the effect of previous conflicts.
succeeded in keeping at low level the influence of their rebellions and con-
centrating to development economic rather than trying to resolve all conflict
cases before moving ahead for economic activities.
4.4 Comparison with the World Bank com-
posite indicator of political stability
Studies on conflict risk modelling are usually conducted as isolated cases in
that sense they rarely try to compare their results with those produced with
different approaches. The World Bank produces the Worldwide Governance
Indicators (WGI) that cover 212 countries for 1996, 1998, 2000, and every
year since 2002. These indicators could be compared for example with the
CIFP index which aims also to provide a risk assessment measure, and vice-
versa.
We have chosen the political stability indicator of WGI as an alternative
measure of risk of conflict with which we can compare our risk index. We
found that the correlation between both indices, as measured by the Spear-
man correlation coefficient, was highly significant (r = −0.77, p < 0.01 in
2004, and r = −0.74, p < 0.01 in 2003). This means that both indices agree
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globally as it can be seen on figure 4.20. These figures plot the logit of our
overall risk index as function of the WB political stability indicator for 2003
and 2004. We used the logit scale because we can expect a linear relationship
between the logit of the estimated probability and the WB indicator which is
based on the distribution of the aggregate of individual indicators. The WB
Iraq
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AFG COD Iraq
India
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Figure 4.20: Comparison of the JRC’s conflict risk index and the WB’s
political stability index in 2003 (left) and 2004 (right). Some extreme points
are labeled with the country name or ISO code (COD for the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, LUX for Luxembourg, and AFG for Afghanistan).
indicator is not a probability measure but a ranking indicator, standardised
to mean 0 and variance 1 worldwide for each year. It is actually a linear
combination of several individual structural indicators, and by consequence,
it should be linearly more or less correlated to the exponent part of the lo-
gistic regression model (equation 3.2). We can observe indeed the expected
linear relationship. The main disagreement cases are Iraq and India, and in
some way the DRC and Afghanistan, for the 2004 data whereas for the 2003
data, the main disagreement cases are Iraq, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Thailand
and India. Our model predicts high risk for India whereas the WB’s index
indicates low level of political instability. On one hand, the fact that India
has been globally stable and experiences rapid economic growth since decades
explains the good score on political instability index. On the other hand, In-
dia has been involved in armed conflicts, of minor intensity compared to its
huge territory and population, but with so many fatalities that they meet the
definition of armed conflict used in this study. As consequence, our model
predicts logically high probability of armed conflicts. In the case of Iraq and
Afghanistan, lack of data on structural indicators as opposed to high media
coverage explains the aforementioned discrepancies. In the case of Georgia
and Azerbaijan, our model predicts low risk, which corresponds indeed to
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structural indicators trend and to the fact that those countries had resolved
their respective internal conflicts in 1993 and 1995. In the meantime, this
countries continued to occupy an important place in the media up to now
in the general context of the Caucasian region politics. This is probably the
reason of the bad score on the WB’s index because it is largely based on
experts’ opinion.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
Throughout this report we hypothesized that a number of widely used struc-
tural indicators might be strongly correlated with the risk of armed conflict
in a country. We found that the regression model may be used to predict
the probability of conflict outbreak and used operationally for warning about
the risk of war in any country. However, while certain structural conditions
may exacerbate already existing political tensions in a country, the mecha-
nisms which then lead to conflict are not well understood and can be highly
specific. The estimates for some countries must be interpreted with caution
as their socioeconomic data were actually sparse. This is especially the case
for Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the model can be updated easily as new
data become available. The method outlined is operational; it can be used
for estimation of conflict probability and for prediction of conflict for coun-
tries for which structural data exists; results are as good as any currently
in use. Estimated probability time series show that our model is consistent
over time.
For decision makers the output of a conflict prediction model should be
the location, time frame, impacts of conflict and conflict response feedback
effects. Models such as ours, using structural data cannot produce such
outputs; they make a static assessment of country level performance, which
can then be ranked for conflict risk.
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Appendix 1. Kenya case study
This short note addresses the root causes of the current political violence in
Kenya1. Since a number of studies on the link between armed conflict and
socio-economic factors have shown some strong correlations between these
phenomena, at-risk situations (in terms of large-scale politically motivated
violence) can be identified and monitored accordingly (Figure 1).
A global model to estimate the risk of armed conflict was developed by
the JRC with an emphasis on structural factors (hereafter referred to as
structural indicators). The first focus was on armed conflicts because they
are better monitored than other, less coordinated political crises, which are
thought to have less impact (casualties and economic loss). It is worth not-
ing however that in many cases, classical armed conflicts develop as a con-
sequence or extension of civil unrest, particularly when the root causes are
not properly addressed or the central government becomes unable to enforce
order on all its territory.
The literature review and variable selection methods identified 9 factors
as being the most influential on the prediction of the risk of armed conflict.
These factors were: (i) indicators of economic activity (GDP per capita,
GDP growth rate, merchandise exports, exports of goods and services as
percent of the GDP), (ii) indicators of economic dependency on foreign aid
(official development aid (ODA) per capita and ODA as percent of GDP),
(iii) indicators of social fractionalization (religious fractionalization index and
ethno-linguistic fractionalization index), (iv) population size, and (v) an in-
dicator of regime type (index of democracy level). They were auto-selected
from a set of 20 factors for their explanatory power.
In a separate analysis undertaken by the JRC, the model took also into
account the effect of past conflicts (history of armed conflict in the country).
The overall risk was obtained by combining both estimates for each country
and each year. The database contains therefore estimates for 196 countries
and for the years from 1971 to 2004. A trend curve of the estimates is
1This note has been written in January 2008 at the moment of the violent events that
erupted after presidential elections of December 2007
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Figure 1: Evolution of the risk of internal (armed) conflict from 1971 to 2004
in Kenya. Estimates are based on socio-economic factors and conflict history
an interesting source of information for early warning because it can show
situations that have been worsening over time. This is important information
for conflict prevention policy implementation. The Kenyan case is illustrative
with this respect. It might be recalled that this model was been developed in
early 2007, and did not take into account the current situation in the country.
The overall risk trend curve shows that the risk of conflict in Kenya has been
rising since 1994 and that the trend has been consistent since then (Figure 1).
While ethnicity has been mentioned as contributing to risk of armed conflict,
Kenya’s high ethnic and religious fractionalization scores do not support this
explanation. In fact, a high number of different groups increases the group
coordination problems and, therefore, given a level of fractionalization, the
probability of civil war may be smaller.
Kenya has had an enviable reputation for stability and economic perfor-
mance among less developed countries. However it seems that this reputation
concealed the real trend of its economic indicators within the context of the
international system. In fact, Kenya’s GDP per capita has been almost con-
stant (around 420 constant 2000 USD/capita) since 1995 while the foreign
development aid has continuously decreased (Figures 2 and 3, respectively).
In the same period, the volume of imports and exports of merchandise in-
creased denoting a dynamic economy (Figure 4). This is the picture of Kenya
considered in isolation.
81
Kenya
300
340
380
420
460
500
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
-1.06
-1.02
-0.98
-0.94
-0.9
-0.86
GDP/capita in USD (left axis)
Standardized GDP/capita (right axis)
Figure 2: Kenya’s GDP per capita trend in absolute values (constant 2000
USD) and relative to other economies (standardized values). Source: The
World Bank, 2006 World Development Indicators.
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Figure 3: Trend in official development assistance (ODA) to Kenya. Source:
The World Bank, 2006 World Development Indicators.
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Figure 4: The trends in Kenya’s export indicators show a contrasted picture:
merchandise exports in absolute values show a consistent and rapid growth
in the first half of the 1990s and since 2000, whereas exports share of GDP
increases from 2000 after a sharp decrease in the 1990s. Source: The World
Bank, 2006 World Development Indicators.
If the figures are put in the context of the global economy, the situation
is different. This has been done by looking at trends of standardized data for
each year. In practice, the index is obtained by subtracting the mean value
and dividing by the standard deviation. Both statistics (mean and standard
deviation) are calculated on the global level and for each year. This indicator
can be regarded as a ranking score to benchmark countries socio-economic
situation. The trend of standardized GDP per capita shows that Kenya’s
score has decreased since 1995 (Figure 2).
Based on this analysis of structural trends, the model determines that
it was possible to alert policymakers to the deteriorating Kenyan situation
before the outbreak of recent violence.
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